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Enforcing Internationally Recognized Human Rights
Violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act: An Analysis
of the Ninth Circuit's Decision in Doe v. Unocal Corp.

JOSHUA

E. KASTENBERG*

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
a United States based corporation can be held civilly liable for "aiding and
abetting" the internationally recognized human rights violation of forced
labor. This case, Doe v. Unocal Corp.1 (Doe I), is significant for its ramifications to human rights litigation in United States courts as well as to
future liability for multinational corporations conducting commerce in foreign states. The uniqueness of this case is found in its precedent. No prior
federal court has held a corporation liable for human rights violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
In 1789, Congress enacted the First Judiciary Act.2 This act included a
jurisdictional provision for district courts that granted foreign persons or
entities the right to sue under tort law for violations committed under the
law of nations.3 This jurisdictional law was named the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA).4 From 1789 until 1984, the ATCA underwent three minor

* Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, USAF-JAG (B.A. UCLA (1989), M.A. Purdue University (1992), J.D.
Marquette University (1996). Major Kastenberg received his LL.M in International and Comparative
Law from Georgetown University (2003), graduating with highest distinction. The author has been a
criminal law prosecutor and defense counsel alternatively for seven years. The author's views in this
article do not reflect those of any agency within the Department of Defense. The author expresses his
thanks to Georgetown Adjunct Professor Mark Srere of Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (Washington
DC); Georgetown Adjunct Professor Sandy Sierk of Cameron & Hombostel LLP (Washington DC);
Neil Posner of Sachnoff & Weaver LLP (Chicago) for his usual brilliant insight; and Elizabeth and
Allenby Kastenberg for their very important wide-ranging help and support.
1. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (Doe 11).
2. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
3. 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
4. This act is also referred to as the Alien Tort Statute.
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alterations 5 culminating in its present form that states: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
6
States.",
For almost two centuries, little use was made of the ATCA, 7 and certainly none of it for allegations of human rights violations based on international norms.8 However, in 1979 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
9
in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,
changed the dormant nature of the ATCA.' °
This case originally involved a New York District Court lawsuit between
Paraguayan litigants for human rights violations that occurred in Paraguay." The United States had no actual nexus to the violations.' 2 Yet, the
Second Circuit found that United States courts had jurisdiction to hear
cases involving human rights violations, wherever these violations occur. 113
As a result of Filartiga, several lawsuits occurred that cited human
rights violations. The majority of these cases involved lawsuits against
foreign government and former foreign government officials. Another
result of Filartigawas legislative, rather than judicial. In 1992, Congress
enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) which created a cause
of action for two violations of international law: torture and summary
execution. 14 The TVPA also bolstered the ATCA by providing the right to

5. Joseph Modeste Sweeny, A Tort only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Hastings Intl. &
Comp. L. Rev. 445, 449-50 (1995) (providing a detailed discussion of the substance of the alterations
to the ATCA).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
7. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Filartigav. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 878, n. 21 (2d Cir. 1980).
8. See e.g. Dreyfus v. von Fink, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1975). In von Fink, the Second Circuit
held that the ATCA's jurisdiction dealt primarily with relationship among nations rather than individuals. Specifically, that court held:
There has been little judicial interpretation of what constitutes the law of nations, and no
universally accepted definition of this phrase.... There is a general consensus, however,
that it deals primarily with the relationship among nations rather than among individuals.
"It is termed the Law of Nations-or International Law-because it is relative to States or
Political Societies and not necessarily to individuals, although citizens or subjects of the
earth are greatly affected by it."
Id.at
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

31 (quoting von Redlich, The Law of Nations 5 (2d ed. 1937)).
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1979).
See id.at 887 (stating that jurisdiction has rarely been based on the ATCA).
Id.at 890.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Act of March 12, 1992, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73. The TVPA reads in pertinent part:
(a) LIABILITY.-An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation-
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sue United States citizens.1 5 Since 1979, ATCA cases have emerged in
three general categories. The first of these categories involves suits by
alien (foreign) plaintiffs against current foreign heads of state and government.1 6 The second category deals with suits by foreign plaintiffs against
former foreign heads of state and government officials.' 7 The third category of ATCA suits involves civil action by foreign plaintiffs against multinational corporations conducting foreign commercial activity in conjunction with foreign governments. 18 This article concerns the third category,
in particular, an analysis of Doe 11.
This article analyzes Doe II under a multi-tiered rubric. The first tier
involves analyzing whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in its jurisdictional interpretation. The second tier studies the extent to which the Ninth
Circuit's use of international law expanded previously accepted usage by
United States courts. For example, after reading Doe II, a question arises
as to whether the Ninth Circuit created a "complete" universal jurisdiction
for torts under the ATCA. The final tier, involves analyzing foreseen legal
consequences. That is, does Doe II expand causes of action for foreign
human rights violations because the decision reduces possible defenses to
tort claims under the ATCA?
Within this multi-dimensional rubric, Doe II must be understood from
its beginnings. Section II discusses the history of Doe II, primarily through
two prior district court decisions. However, in order to analyze Doe II, a
meaningful background to the ATCA must be determined. Section III of
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that
individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
(b) EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES.-A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which
the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.
(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-No action shall be maintained under this section
unless it is commenced within 10 years after the cause of action arose.
Id.
15. Id. For a brief but insightful discussion of the TVPA see Steven Ratner & Jason Abrams, Accountabilityfor Human Rights Atrocities in InternationalLaw: Beyond the Nuremburg Legacy, 243 (2d
ed., Oxford U. Press 2001).
16. See e.g. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (suing Zimbabwe's ruling
party); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (1995) (suing President of Bosnia-Herzegovina).
17. See e.g. In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994) [hereinafter Marcos I1] (suing estate of former Philippine leader Ferdinand Marcos).
18. See e.g. Estate ofRodriguez v. Drummond Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6657 (N.D. Al. April 14,
2003) (accusing an American corporation of collaboration with Columbian paramilitary); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (accusing a Canadian
corporation of collaborating with Sudan for ethnic cleansing).
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this paper provides this background. Particular attention is paid to the Filartiga decision and its progeny because Doe II relied, in large-part, on
principles established in Filartiga. Section IV provides context for the
suit, namely, the nature of human rights violations occurring in Myanmar
where the plaintiffs allege the violations occurred. Section V analyzes the
Ninth Circuit's unique application of International Law. Section VI analyzes foreseeable consequences to defenses against ATCA suits. In particular, defenses under the act of state doctrine, dismissal under the indispensable parties rule, andforum non conveniens are addressed. This article
concludes with the final assessment that while Doe II is rooted in fundamentally correct interpretations of the law, it both expands the parameters
of corporate liability and it fundamentally alters the ability to defend
against ATCA suits.
II. DOE V. UNOCAL CORP.: FACTS AND HISTORY

A. Note on Unocal
Union Oil Corporation of California (Unocal) was formed in 1890.19 It
is headquartered in El Segundo, California.20 Unocal currently employs
over 6,500 people and conducts expansive operations throughout the
world. 2' These operations are mainly in the area of natural gas extraction
and transportation, crude oil extraction, and pipeline construction.2 2 In
2001, the company enjoyed revenues of 6.8 billion dollars and earnings of
615 million dollars. 23 Unocal first explored the possibility of extraction
operations in Myanmar in 1990.24 In 1993, it obtained a 28.26% share 25 in
a project run by Total Fina Elf S.A., a Europe based petroleum corporation.26 The project was centered on extracting gas from the Yadana natural
19. Unocal Corp., Unocal, All about Unocal. Unocal at a Glance, Around the World 2003 1
<http://www.unocal.com/aboutucl/uclataglance.pdf> (accessed June 14, 2003) [hereinafter Around the
World] (also refered to on the web site as Unocal Fact Sheet).
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. Unocal conducts business in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, the Netherlands, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, Myanmar, China, and domestically in the Gulf Coast Region, and
Alaska. Id.
22. Id.
23. Unocal Corp., Unocal, Investor Information, Data Warehouse, 2000-2003 Quarterly Fact Book
2 <http://www.unocal.com/investor/qfb0003.pdf > (accessed June 27, 2003).
24. Id. For general background see Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883-84 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (Doe l(a)); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178-79 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
25. Unocal Corp., Unocal,All about Unocal,InternationalEnergy Operations, Thailand, Thailand
Fact Sheet, 1 <http://www.unocal.com/globalops/fact-thailand.pdf > (accessed June 27, 2003) [hereinafter ThailandFact Sheet].
26. Total Fina Elf became Total S.A. in 1995.
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gas field and transporting it, via pipeline, for power generation in Thailand.27

Unocal has a Corporate Responsibility Program (CRP).28 In 2001, the
corporation spent six million dollars in worldwide programs to promote
"sustainable community development," advance the well being of children,
and provide educational programs.2 9 Judging from their investor relations
web site, it appears some of this money was spent in Myanmar. 30 However, none of the published court decisions relating to this case state that
Unocal's CRP was utilized in Myanmar.
B. Doe I(a)

In October 1996, fourteen plaintiffs from the Tenasserim region in
Burma filed a class action suit against Unocal, based in part on the ATCA,
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.3'
Other defendants named in this suit were, Total S.A. (Total),3 2 the Myanma
Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE),33 the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC), 34 Mr. John Imle (Imle), 35 and Mr. Roger C. Beach

(Beach).3 6 For purposes of this article, the defendants will be referred to as
"the joint venture," except where Unocal's specific role is addressed.
Throughout Doe, the plaintiffs alleged they were the victims of human
rights abuses perpetrated by the military government in Myanmar.37 The
27. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (Doe l(a)).
28. Unocal Corp., Unocal,CorporateResponsibility at Unocal < http://www.unocal.com/
responsibility/index.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003).
29. Around the World, supran. 19, at 1.
30. Unocal Corp., Unocal, Corporate Responsibility at Unocal: 2000-2001 Report, Community
Involvement and Support, Myanmar <http://www.unocal.com/responsibility/01cr-report/
myanmar.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003).
31. Doe, 963 F. Supp at 883 (Doe l(a)). The original fourteen plaintiffs were expected to be joined
by thousands of others. The plaintiffs were farmers from the above-noted region. Id.
32. Total S.A. is a European petroleum and extraction company. See e.g. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27
F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178-79 (C.D. Cal. 1998). The district court, in determining it lacked jurisdiction
over Total, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit against it. Id. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 921 (9th
Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit against Total.
33. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (Doe 1(a)).
34. Id. SLORC is the ruling body in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma. Id.
35. Id. Mr. Imle was the president of Unocal. Id.
36. Id. Mr. Beach was the chairman of Unocal from 1994 until 2001 and the chief executive officer
(CEO) of Unocal from 1995 until 2001. Unocal Corp., Unocal,All about Unocal, A History of Unocal,
<www.unocal.com/aboutucl/history/ index.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003).
37. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (Doe l(a)). Additionally, in September 1996, four villagers from the
Tenasserim region, the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma and the National Coalition Government
of the Union of Burma filed suit, titled National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997), under the ATCA in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged violations under the law of nations as a basis for
the ATCA claim, and violations of state law. Id. at 335.
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plaintiffs specifically claimed that during a pipeline construction, begun in
1991, they were subjected to, inter alia, forced labor, torture, murder of
family members, forced displacement, and rape.3 8 The pipeline construction, known as the Yadana project, was designed to ferry natural gas across
Myanmar for eventual power generation in Thailand. 39 The particular allegations were raised under the ATCA as violating the law of nations. 40 The
direct perpetrators of these offenses were state actors from SLORC: its
military, intelligence agents, and police. 41 However, the plaintiffs alleged
that because Unocal, Total, Imle, and Beach were jointly engaged with the
Myanmar government in the pipeline construction, the district court possessed jurisdiction over the defendants. 42 Specifically, the plaintiffs' contended Unocal and Total contracted with the Myanmar government for use
of its military to provide security. 43 District Court Judge Richard Paez held
that the district court possessed jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' ATCA
claims.44
The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over SLORC
and MOGE because of their entitlement to sovereign immunity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 4 5 Relying on the plain language of this act as well as Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,46 the court determined
SLORC and MOGE's activity did not fit into one of the commercial activ38. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883-85 (Doe l(a)).
39. Id. at 883-85.
40. Id. at 892.
41. Id. at 883.
42. Id. at 883-84. The Plaintiffs also asserted claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), violations of the California Business & Professions Code § 17200, and
several generic torts such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, negligent
hiring, and assault. As to the ATCA claim, the court accepted as fact that in 1991 Unocal and Total
contracted with the Myanmar government to clear forest, construct road access, and provide security
for a natural gas pipeline running from the Andaman Sea through the Tenasserim region of Burma and
into Thailand. Id.
43. Id. at 883.
44. Id. at 884. Other tort claims were dismissed under applicable statutes of limitation. See id at

897.
45. Id. at 885. Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1330, "the [FSIA] provides the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state" in domestic courts. Id. at 886 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507
U.S. 349, 355, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1476, 123 L. Ed. 2d 47, 58 (1993)). Generally under the FSIA, a foreign state is immune from law suits. Id. (citations omitted). However, there are three exceptions to the

general rule of immunity. Id. These exceptions are as follows:
[I] the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect on the United States[.]
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2003).
46. 507 U.S. 349, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1993).
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ity exceptions enabling jurisdiction.4 7 However, despite dismissing
court determined that they
SLORC and MOGE from the case, the district
48
were not indispensable parties to the suit.
Reviewing principles of jurisdiction under the ATCA, the court first
determined that official torture rose to the level of ajus cogens norm and
therefore jurisdiction attached. 49 Further, the court held that the plaintiff's
allegations constitute state action. 50 Namely, Unocal, SLORC, and MOGE
were "joint venturers, working in concert with one another; and that the
defendants have conspired to commit the violations of international law...
to further the interests of the Yadana gas pipeline project," to constitute
state action. 51 In essence, the allegation was sufficient to establish subjectmatter jurisdiction under the ATCA.5 2 However, the court recognized that
under some circumstances, such as forced labor, private actors may be
liable for violations of international law absent state action. 3 Thus the
court did4 not conduct a state-action analysis for forced labor as it had for
torture.
Unocal also argued for dismissal under the act of state doctrine
claiming a grant of jurisdiction would "interfere with the foreign policy
efforts of Congress and the President., 55 The court reaffirmed the act of
47. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 888 (Doe 1(a)).
48. Id. at 884. Indispensable parties are governed by Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In order to determine whether a party is indispensable, courts engage in a two step inquiry.
"First, the court must determine whether the absent party is necessary and cannot be joined." Id. at
889. If the answer is in the affirmative, "the court must then determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed." Id. In this
case, Unocal initially argued SLORC and MOGE were entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at 884. In
prevailing in this argument, Unocal relied upon Aquinda v. Texaco Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), and then argued for dismissal based on fairness. See Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 889 (Doe l(a)).
49. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (Doe l(a)). A Jus cogens norm is a principle of international law that
is accepted by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted. See e.g. Princz v. FederalRepublic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
50. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (Doe l(a)).
51. Id. at 891. State action is essentially defined as "an act under color of law" by a state
instrumentality. See e.g. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp, 513 U.S. 374 (1995). A private
individual acts under color of law within the meaning of the ATCA when he acts together with state
officials or with significant state aid. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (Doe l(a)).
52. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (Doe 1(a)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 892. To establish a claim for some offenses under the ATCA against a private party, the
plaintiff must prove the defendant engaged under color of state action. Id. at 891. It appears there are
two sequential questions. The first question arises as to whether the corporate entity's activities were
independently commercial, or did the commercial activity assist the criminal actor-in this case,
SLORC-to the degree that the commercial activity "aided and abetted" the criminal actor. If the latter
answer is true-as argued in this article-then the second question involves determining whether the
"aiding and abetting" extinguishes the act of state doctrine, or if the doctrine remains viable. Id. at 892.
55. Id. The act of state doctrine is premised on the separation of powers. Republic of Philippinesv.
Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 427-28, 84 S. Ct. 923, 940 (1964)). The Ninth Circuit in Doe l(a) held, "the act of state doctrine
'reflects the prudential concern that the courts, if they question the validity of sovereign acts taken by
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state doctrine principle that, "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done
within its own territory. 5 6 The district court further held, "[r]edress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 57 This
definition was originally supplied by the Supreme Court in Banco National
de Cuba v. Sabbatino.58 After a lengthy analysis of the act of state doctrine's applicability in regard tojus cogens violations, the court concluded
that "the high degree of international consensus," as to the seriousness of
the alleged offenses, "severely undermines [Unocal's] argument that
SLORC and MOGE's alleged activities should be treated as acts of
59
state."
Finally, the court analyzed Unocal's remaining fact-based argument
for dismissal. Unocal argued that because the plaintiffs did not allege that
Unocal directly participated in torture or forced labor, but rather accepted
this labor from SLORC, the case warranted dismissal.6 ° Moreover, Unocal
argued that the plaintiffs' allegations, even if true, merely established a
business relationship between SLORC and Unocal. 6' The court disagreed
with this argument and found sufficient facts that "plaintiffs could conceivably prove facts to support . . . that Unocal and SLORC have either
conspired or acted as joint participants to deprive plaintiffs of international
human rights in order to further their financial interests in the Yadana gas

foreign states, may be interfering with the conduct of American foreign policy by the Executive and
Congress."' Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892-93 (Doe I(a)) (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic ofArgentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992)).
56. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892 (Doe 1(a)) (citing Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,376 U.S. 398,
423, 84 S. Ct 923, 937-38, 123 L. Ed. 2d 804, 820 (1964) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252, 18 S. Ct. 83, 84, 42 L. Ed. 456, 457 (1897))).
57. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 892 (Doe1(a)).
58. 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1964). In Sabbatino, the Court held "maintaining
intact the act of state doctrine" serves both the national interest and "progress toward the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations." 376 U.S. at 437.
59. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 894 (Doe1(a)). The court further concluded:
[b]ecause nations do not, and cannot under international law, claim a right to torture or enslave their own citizens, a finding that a nation has committed such acts, particularly where,
as here, that finding comports with the prior conclusions of the coordinate branches of government, should have no detrimental effect on the policies underlying the act of state doctrine.

Id
60. Id.at 896.
61.

Id.
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pipeline project. ,62 Thus, the court determined the case merited a hearing
before a trier of fact.
C. Doe l(b)
On October 31, 2001, District Court Judge Ronald Lew, granted Unocal's motion for summary judgment based on further jurisdictional arguments. 63 The court analyzed the plaintiffs' claims in light of past ATCA
decisions. 64 The court framed its analysis in a two-step process. First, the
court had to determine "whether the conduct of the Myanmar military violated international law." 65 Second, if the first question was answered in the
affirmative, the court had to assess "whether Unocal [wa]s liable for
th[o]se violations. 6 6
Reviewing the first question, the court held that "[a]ctionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory., 67 In other words, the court applied ajus cogens threshold for
jurisdiction. Additionally, because Unocal argued that only jus cogens
violations are actionable under the ATCA, the court distinguished between
customary international law andjus cogens.6 8 The court defined customary
international law as "rest[ing] on the consent of the states., 69 In essence,
the court held "that those states that do not agree to a norm of customary
international law are not bound by it."' 70 In definingjus cogens as "values
taken to be fundamental by the international community... [that] are binding on all nations," the court determined that the ATCA conferred jurisdiction overjus cogens offenses only. 71 The court held torture, murder, genocide, and slavery as violations ofjus cogens norms. 72 The court further
recognized that the law of nations regarding piracy and slavery has been

62. Id. The court further addressed statutes of limitation, equitable tolling, and remaining claims not
related to the ATCA. Id.at 896-97.
63. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (Doe 1(b)).
64. Id. at 1303-05. The court specifically analyzed norms regarding forced labor, relying on reports
by the International Labor Organization (ILO). d.at 1308. The ILO is the primary agency within the
United Nations for workers rights. Id. In 1996, it specifically reviewed labor practices in Myanmar.
Id. Interestingly, Unocal appeared to concede forced labor occurred when it argued before Judge Lew
that federal law recognizes the right of states to utilize forced labor "for the public good." Id.
65. Id.at 1303.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1304 (citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715).
70. Id. (citing Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715).
71. Id. (relying on Estate l, 25 F.3d at 1475).
72. Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d, at 1304 (Doe l(b)) (citations omitted).
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historically applied to private actors, but not torture and summary execution (murder).7 3
However, the court's analysis of state action liability led it to dismiss
the plaintiffs' suit as to the murder and torture claims.7 4 The court held
that for jurisdiction over Unocal to attach, its participation in the pipeline
project had to constitute state action under the joint action test.75 In order

to satisfy that test, Unocal had to be a "willful participant in joint action
with [Myanmar] or its agents. ,,76 Because the plaintiffs presented no direct
allegation that Unocal conspired, participated in, or influenced SLORC's
conduct, the plaintiffs' suit as to summary execution (murder) and torture
failed. 7 Thus, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit, the court considered that
Unocal would have to have been an active participant in order for it to find
asserted internaUnocal had aided and abetted the Myanmar military in the
78
tional law violations, with the exception of forced labor.
The court assessed Unocal's liability as a private actor for forced labor
and held that the plaintiffs had a burden of establishing Unocal's legal responsibility for the Myanmar military's forced labor activities. 79 The court
also analyzed the plaintiffs' argument that "knowledge and approval of
acts is sufficient for a finding of liability" by looking at the post-World
War II trials of German industrialists.80 However, in some of those trials,
the tribunals determined knowledge of slave labor usage alone was an insufficient ground for guilt.8 ' That is, where those defendants could estab73. Id. at 1305.
74. Id.
75. Id. In order to be liable for certain offenses in violation of the law of nations, the perpetrator
must be acting under color of state action. For instance Unocal would not be liable under the ATCA
for committing an offense such as summary execution. In that case, a plaintiff would have to seek
jurisdiction under a different theory of liability. Under the joint action test, state action is present if a
private party is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents." Id. In ATCA cases, the
"color of law" jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged
in official action for purposes of jurisdiction. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1996). "A
private individual acts under 'color of law' within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together
with state officials or with significant state aid." Id.
76. Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305 (Doe 1(b)) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.
Ct. 183, 186, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185, 189 (1980)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 1309. (looking to the International Military Tribunals (IMT) conducted against German "captains of industry" after World War H1).
80. Id. at 1309. There were twelve trials conducted. Id. In U.S. v. Flick, four of the defendants
were entitled to a defense of necessity and were therefore not guilty. Id. (citing 6 Tr. of War Crim.
before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1196 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off.
1952)). In U.S. v. Krauch, five of the defendants were found guilty, in part, because "they embraced
the opportunity to take full advantage of slave labor program." Id. at 1310 (citing 8 Tr. of War Crim.
before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1179 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off.
1952) [hereinafter L G. Farben).
81. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-10 (Doe 1(b)) (requiring knowledge and participation).
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lish "necessity," the burden of proving guilt was considerably higher because the prosecution then encountered a burden of proving the weakness
of the necessity defense.82 Likewise, the court held that while there was
ample evidence that Unocal knew SLORC "employed forced labor," there
was no evidence Unocal specifically sought its use. 83 In essence, the district court found no domestic or international principle of law establishing
liability for passively participating, or financially benefiting, from slave
labor. As a result, no liability attached to Unocal and the court granted
Unocal summary judgment.84
D. Doe II
1. The Majority Opinion
a. Pertinent Facts in the Decision
On September 18, 2002, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment to Unocal,85 criticizing both its interpretation
of international law 86 and its jurisdictional analysis. 87 In doing so, the
Ninth Circuit published an extensive factual background to the case. The
court first noted that all parties to the suit agreed that the "Myanmar Military provided security and other services for the [pipeline construction]. 8 8
It found there was sufficient evidence to raise "a genuine issue of material
fact whether the [joint venture] hired the Myanmar Military, and whether
Unocal knew of this." 89 During earlier depositions, in corporate news releases, 90 and at the district court, Unocal disputed that the joint venture
82. ld. at 1310.
83. Id. The court specifically held:
there are no facts suggesting that Unocal sought to employ forced or slave labor.... The
evidence does suggest that Unocal knew forced labor was being utilized and that the Joint
Venturers benefited from the practice. However, because such a showing is insufficient to
establish liability under international law, Plaintiff's claim against Unocal for forced labor
under the [ATCA] fails as a matter of law.
Id.
84. Id. In this decision, the court also dismissed the plaintiffs' RICO claims. Id. at 1311.
85. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *55 (Doe Il).
86. Id. at *36.
87. Id. at *37.
88. Id. at *6. The court drew this inference, in part, from a Unocal memorandum documenting that
corporation's meetings with Total where the use of Myanmar security was discussed, as well as a
deposition from a former soldier guarding the project. Id.
89. Id. at *7.
90. Unocal Corp., Unocal, CorporateResponsibility, Human Rights and Unocal, Human Rights and

Economic Engagement <http://www.unocal.com/responsibility/humanrights/hr5.htm> (stating that
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hired the Myanmar military, and if it did, that Unocal knew about it. 91 The

court, while not ruling on Unocal's knowledge, called into question the
veracity of Imle's and Beach's denials. 92 The court also noted evidence
93
indicating that Unocal had the ability to influence the Myanmar military.

In short, the court determined that the evidence raised a genuine issue regarding Unocal's relationship to the Myanmar military through their partnership in the joint venture.94

The court then analyzed evidence regarding Unocal's knowledge of
human rights abuses.95 It noted several plaintiffs earlier testified that the
Myanmar Military subjected them to rape, murder, and torture.96 The court
also noted an abundance of international law reports that catalogued human
rights abuses, such as forced labor, in Myanmar. 97 Additionally, it recognized several instances where human rights organizations provided Unocal
with information detailing that forced labor occurred at the Yadana project. 98 The court found it compelling that one of Unocal's own consultants,

"a former military attach6 at the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, reported to

Unocal that 'the Myanmar Military was, in fact, using forced labor and

committing other human rights violations in connection with the Project."' 99 Finally, the court noted a series of communications between Unocal and Total "reflect[ing] the companies' shared knowledge that the

pipeline workers were paid at least a market wage).
91. Id.at**7-8.
92. Id. at *8. The court noted that Total briefed Imle and Beach in 1996 on the issues of pipeline
security and labor wages. Id.
93. Id. at **10-11. The court noted an e-mail from Unocal's Director of Information to a company
spokesman which provided evidence of Unocal's influence over the Myannar military. Id. at *10.
94. Id.at *9.
95. Id. at*11.
96. Id. at *12. One compelling instance in the evidence relates to "Jane Doe I." She testified that
her husband was shot at by soldiers in an attempt to escape the forced labor program at the construction
site. In retaliation for his escape attempt, the soldiers threw her and her baby into a fire, killing the
baby. The court also noted other witnesses who testified to observing executions of villagers who
refused to work as well as those who were too weak to work. Still other witnesses testified to being
raped by soldiers. Id.
97. Id. at * 13.
98. Id. For example, in 1995, Amnesty International "alerted Unocal to the possibility that the
Myanmar military might used forced labor in connection with the project." Id.
99. Id. at * 18. Mr. John Haseman, a former United States Military Attach6 to Rangoon specifically
told Unocal that:
Unocal was particularly discredited when a corporate spokesman was quoted as saying that
Unocal was satisfied with... assurances [by the Myanmar Military] that no human rights
abuses were occurring in the area of pipeline construction . . . Unocal, by seeming to have
accepted [the Myanmar Military]'s version of events, appears at best naive and at worst a
willing partner in the situation.
Id. at **18-19 (brackets in original).
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Myanmar Military was using forced labor in connection with the Project." 100
b. The Court's Legal Analysis
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by determining that the plaintiffs'
allegations constituted a violation of the law of nations.10 The court, in
relying on past precedent, held that torture, murder, and slavery constituted
jus cogens offenses.10 2 The court also held that rape can constitute torture,
and thus embody ajus cogens offense. 0 3 It determined that since the allegations of murder, rape, and torture were committed in furtherance of
forced labor, the doctrine of state action did not preclude the plaintiffs'
claims.1°4 The court then held "that forced labor is a modem variant of
slavery."' 0 5 In addition to supporting the view that private actor liability
extended to the offense of forced labor, the court noted
the same held true
06
for claims arising under the Thirteenth Amendment. 1
Up to this point, the court below and the Ninth Circuit were in agreement. While the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision 0to7
apply international law as developed by international criminal tribunals,1
it disagreed with the lower court's determination that for Unocal to be li-

100. Id. at *19. The court specifically noted that "on September 17, 1996, Total reported to Unocal
about a meeting with a European Union civil servant in charge of an investigation of forced labor in
Myanmar ....Id. at *20. The civil servant concluded that the forced labor was occurring in relation to
the project. Id.The court also appeared to cast an aspersion on Imle and Unocal's honesty in depositions. For example, the court found that on March 4, 1997:
Unocal nevertheless submitted a statement to the City Counsel of New York, in response to
a proposed New York City select purchasing law imposed on firms that do business in
Myanmar, in which Unocal stated that "no [human rights] violations have taken place" in
the vicinity of the pipeline route.
Id. at **20-21 (brackets in original).
101. Id. at*29.
102. Id. at **28-29, In relying, in part, on U.S. v. Matta-Ballesteros,71 F.3d 754, 764 n. 5 (9th Cir.
1995), the court determined that murder, torture, and slavery were peremptory norms from which no
derogation is permitted. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *28 (Doe II).
103. Id. at *28. The court relied on Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Formerv. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 852, 854, 114 S. Ct 1970, 1987, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 835 (1994) where prison rape was described as
"the equivalent of' and "nothing less than torture." Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *28 (Doe
H).
104. Id.at*31.
105. Id. at *32. In making this determination, the court relied on the language of the Thirteenth
Amendment and Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17, 64 S.Ct. 792, 799, 88 L. Ed. 1095, 1103 (1944).
Id. The Thirteenth Amendment reads: "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist
within the United States .... U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
106. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *33 n. 18 (Doe 11).
107. Id. at *39.
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08
able, its conduct would have to rise to the level of "active participation."'
Instead, the court applied the recent international law understanding of
accomplice liability and defined "aiding and abetting" similar to definitions created by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) 0 9 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)."
The plaintiffs contended Unocal was also liable under theories of joint
venture, agency, negligence, and recklessness."' However, the court declined to address these claims, because neither the district court nor Unocal
addressed any of these alternative theories. 112 Nonetheless, the court con3
cluded, these alternative theories may also be appropriate to consider. 1
The Ninth Circuit defined the two elements of "aiding and abetting" as
"knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime,"' 1 4 and "actual or constructive

'knowledge ... that [the accomplice's] actions will assist the perpetrator

in the commission of the crime."""' Applying these elements to the facts,
the court concluded enough evidence existed to establish a prima facie case
108. Id. at *37. The Ninth Circuit held the lower court's use of the "active participation standard"
occurred because that court misapplied the standards in the German industrialist cases. The Ninth
Circuit argued the IMT applied the active participation standard only to overcome the defendant's
necessity defenses. Id. The Ninth Circuit further held the necessity defense was inapplicable for Unocal. Id. The Ninth Circuit also did not limit its sources of international law to tribunals, acknowledging the scholarship of jurists and other general practices of nations. Id.
109. See e.g. United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, S.C. Res. 827, 48 U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing ICTY). For a contextual narrative of the events related to the
ICTY, see e.g. Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY-94-1
689 (May 7, 1997) <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/
trialc2/judgementltad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.> (accessed June 27, 2003). On June 25, 1991, Croatia and
Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Id. at 27 77. The Serbian leader of Yugoslavia,
Slobodan Milosevic, ordered the army to invade Slovenia. See id. (Slovenia's independence challenged militarily by JNA.). After European intervention, Milosevic then turned the army toward Croatia. Id. at 44 123. In January 1992, the United Nations brokered a cease-fire between the two. During this time, ethnically diverse Bosnia-Herzegovina, another Yugoslav province, declared its independence. Id. at 27
78. Within that province Muslims and Croats found themselves fighting Serbs.
See id.at 29 84. From 1992 until 1995, Serbian military and paramilitary groups engaged in a pattern
of human rights abuses that came to be known under the umbrella label, "ethnic cleansing." Id. at 84.
It is estimated that over 100,000 persons perished during the fighting. The ICTY was established in
1993 to prosecute war crimes such as crimes against humanity and genocide. Id. at 2
110. See e.g. United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, S.C. Res. 955, 49 U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the ICTR); see Prosecutorv. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judm. 484485, 548 (ICTR Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001
.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003). Between April to July 1994, between 500,000 and over one million
persons belonging mostly to a distinct minority group, the Tutsi, were executed by Rwandan government forces, their intermediaries, and supporters. Id. at
110-111. Individuals considered by the
United Nations Security Council (Security Council) to be perpetrators or main participants of crimes
related to this event were ultimately indicted, and in an ongoing process, brought to trial before an ad
hoc tribunal specifically created to punish those offenders under international law. Id.at 129.
11. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *36 n. 20 (Doe 11).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *36.
115. Id.at*47.
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of forced labor, murder, and rape. 1 6 The court also held that since the
plaintiffs' case theory rested on proving the murder, rape, and torture occurred in furtherance of forced labor, state action was not required to give
rise to liability under the ATCA."1 7 However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit for torture because other than rape, the pleadings did not contain adequate proof of torture.' 18 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the lower court's dismissal of the Myanmar Military and MOGE
recognizing that the FSIA precluded jurisdiction" 9 and dismissed the
20
plaintiffs' RICO12claims.1
The court concluded that RICO did not extend
1
to ATCA cases.

2. Judge Stephen Reinhardt's Concurrence
In his concurrence, Judge Reinhardt agreed with the majority that the
ATCA conferred jurisdiction to the district court to adjudicate the plaintiffs
allegations. 22 He also agreed with the court's presentation of facts relevant to its determination. Additionally, he found that if allegations of
23
forced labor were proven, Unocal would be liable under the ATCA.1
However, Judge Reinhardt disagreed with both the court's application of
international law in defining 1ancillary
issues such as accomplice liability,
24
and its analysis ofjus cogens.
In terms of defining liability, Judge Reinhardt concluded that "federal
common law tort principles, such as agency, joint venture, or reckless disregard," were the correct means for determining liability. 25 In particular,
he found the court's application of accomplice liability, defined from the
ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals, troublesome because their accomplice
liability definition permits the "imposition of liability for the lending of
moral support.'

26

Judge Reinhardt conceded that Unocal's liability, in

terms of choice of law, under the ATCA presented a case of first impression. 127 However, he argued federal common law served as the correct

116. See id. at *63 (Because Unocal knew that acts of violence were about to occur, it was liable as
an aider and abettor when those acts occurred.).
117. See id. (liable as an aider and abettor if acts occurred).
118. Id. at *63.
119. Id. at *79.
120. Id.at *83.
121. Id. at **81-82.
122. Id.at *84.
123. Id. at *83.
124. Id. at **84-85. Judge Reinhardt found the court's analysis ofjus cogens interesting from a
scholarly point of view, but irrelevant to the case. Id. at *89 n. 2.
125. Id. at *85.
126. Id. at *84.
127. Id. at *90.
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basis for determining Unocal's liability as to ancillary issues such as defining accomplice liability. 128 He further argued that common law principles
are more than adequate for defining accomplice liability because they have
been applied to similar domestic cases for years. 2 9 Yet, he acknowledged
that the TVPA, FSIA, and the substantive component of the ATCA obligated the use of international law.130 Judge Reinhardt's chief concern with
the application of international law for third-party liability stemmed from
the ICTY's and ICTR's "uncertain and inchoate rule,"' 131 of liability based
on "practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support.... ,,32
Instead, Judge Reinhardt's inquiry as to choice of law relied, in part,
on principles set forth by the 1900 case, The Paquete Habana 133 where the
Supreme Court held that in appropriate circumstances federal common law
incorporates principles of international law. 134 To Judge Reinhardt, these
factors included: (1)ease in determining the law to be applied; (2) "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result;" and, (3) the application of
well-known 35legal principles over unsettled international principles of recent origin.'
As noted above, in applying federal common law to Doe, Judge
Reinhardt posited three theories of third-party liability. The first of these
theories is "joint venture liability."' 136 Under this theory, "a member of a
joint venture is liable for the acts of its co-venturers.'9 137 Judge Reinhardt
argued that the joint venture theory is well established in international law
as well as under domestic law. 38 He also argued that agency liability
could be applied. 139 Under this theory, for example, an employer is responsible for the acts of his or her employees. 140 It is up to the jury to determine the existence of an agency relationship mirroring employment or
other fiduciary responsibility. 14 ' As in the case of joint venture liability,
128. Id. at *91.

Judge Reinhardt acknowledged that federal courts ordinarily apply federal common

law in limited circumstances such as when Congress authorizes them to do so. Id. However, he argued
that international relations is one area where federal common law is "frequently applied." Id.
129. Id.at *95.
130. Id. at *96.
131. Id.at*105.
132. Id. at *105 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzya, IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998) (reprinted in 38
I.L.M. 317, 235 (1999))).
133. 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900).
134. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *104 (Doe I1).
135. Id.at**98-99.
136. Id. at *107.
137. Id. at*107 (citing Davidson v. Enstar Corp., 848 F.2d 574, 577-78 (5th Cir. 1988)).
138. Doe,2002 U.S. App.LEXIS 19263 at**108-109 (Doe11).
139. Id. at *113.
140. Id. at *114 (citing Moriarityv. Gluckert FuneralHome, Ltd., 155 F.3d 859, 866 n. 15 (7th Cir.
1998)).
141. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at * 114 (Doe11).
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Judge Reinhardt found that agency principles are well established under
both domestic and international law.1 42 Finally, Judge Reinhardt found the
theory of reckless disregard applicable 143 and recognized it as a principle in
both domestic and international law.' 44

III. DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPTS AND
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT PRIOR TO DOE V.UNOCAL CORP.: THE
MOVE TOWARD CORPORATE LIABILITY

As noted above, from 1789 to 1979, few civil actions were pursued
under the ATCA. The first successful civil action involving human rights
violations occurred in the 1979 Filartiga case. 145 Cases occurring after
Filartigaexpanded principles set forth in that decision and merit review
for this paper. As noted in the introduction, review of prior ATCA decisions prior are necessary to any conduct meaningful analysis of Doe H.
A. Filartigav. Pena-Irala
In 1979, two Paraguayan citizens, Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter,
Dolly Filartiga, filed suit in New York District Court under the ATCA
against another Paraguayan citizen, Americo Norbero Pena-Irala. 46 PenaIrala had been the Inspector General of Police in the city of Asuncion,
Paraguay.147 The plaintiffs alleged that on March 29, 1976, in Asuncion,
48
Pena-Irala kidnapped and murdered Dr. Filartiga's son Joelito Filartiga.
This apparently occurred in response to Dr. Filartiga's political activity
against the Paraguayan government. 149 No component of that murder, in142. Id. at *115. Judge Reinhardt cited to, inter alia, Bazley v. Curry, 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can. 1999)
(Canadian Supreme Court); the Civil Code of France, Art. 1384 (1984); the Civil Code of Germany §
831 (1975); and Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Power & Light Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 215 (Belgium v. Spain). Id. at **115-116.
143. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *119 (Doe 11).
144. Id. at **120-123. Judge Reinhardt drew attention to, inter alia, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 836, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1978, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 826 (1994) and Youell v. Exxon Corp, 48 F.3d.
105, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1994).
145. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Later that day, Dolly Filartiga was escorted to the Pena-lrala home by the Paraguayan
police where she saw her brother's dead and tortured body. As she fled from the home, Pena-lrala
followed her shouting, "'Here you have what you have been looking for so long and what you deserve.
Now shut up."' Id.
149. Id.
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0
cluding the preparation, had any geographic nexus to the United States. 15
At that time, Paraguay was governed by military dictatorship, and its human rights reputation was almost universally condemned.'5215 At the time of
suit all parties were geographically located in New York.
On May 15, 1979, the district court, in construing that "law of nations" excluded a state's treatment of its own citizens, dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. 153 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
155
reversed. 154 The court, relying on the Supreme Court case, U.S. v. Smith
reiterated "the law of nations 'may be ascertained by consulting the works
of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law.",, 156 That the Second Circuit recognized that in interpreting international law, evolving standards and theoretical arguments played a role is
significant. This is because international law is often not codified.'1 The
Second Circuit, in its reversal of the lower court, refused to be locked into
a narrow definitional interpretation of the ATCA's law of nations element,
and gave recognition to the evolving standards of international law. The
court specifically held that to determine the standard of international law
offenses in violation of the laws of nations a court must look to the law's
current form rather than the form of the law in 1789.158 Some of the
court's recognition was based on the fact that the United Nations Charter
"makes it clear that ... a state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of

150. See id. (kidnapped, tortured, and murdered in Paraguay).
151. Id. Paraguay was governed under the administration of Alfredo Stroessner who had been in
power since 1954. Id. at 878.
152. Id. Dolly Filartiga entered the United States in 1978. Id. Pena-Irala entered the United States in
1978, but by the time he was served with his court summons, he was awaiting deportation for overstaying his visa. Id. at 879.
153. Id. at 880. The district court, in making this decision, relied on von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1975) and lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). Id. Two days after dismissing its case,
Pena-Irala returned to Paraguay. Id.
154. Id. at 878.
155. 18 U.S. 153, 160, 5 L. Ed. 57 (1820).
156. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 880 (quoting U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61, 5 L. Ed. 57, 58-59
(1820)).
157. Id. See e.g. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S.Ct 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900), where the
Court held:
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these,
to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience,
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat ....
Id. at 880-88 1.
158. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 880.
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support
international concern."15 9 Additionally, the Second Circuit found 60
in the Declaration of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture. 1
Having accepted torture as a violation of the law of nations,1 6 1 the Second Circuit then was confronted by an issue of geographic nexus. The
torture occurred in Paraguay. 162 However, the court held, "[c]ommon law
courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate transitory tort claims
between individuals over whom they exercise personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred."' 163 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded the ATCA
opened the federal courts for adjudication of rights already recognized by
international law.164 In doing so, as discussed below, the Second Circuit
created a narrow but universal jurisdiction for civil tort actions based on
the law of nations. Finally, the Second Circuit provided philosophical
guidance for its reasoning:
In the twentieth century the international community has come to
recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of
basic human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture..
. . In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that
respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective interest .... Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Conof the ageless
gress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment
165
dream to free all people from brutal violence.
Although Filartigawas not granted certiorari by the Supreme Court,
principles established in that case appear to have been given credence by
the Court. In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 166 the
Court held that Argentina could not be liable under the ATCA because the
Court determined the FSIA was the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction
over sitting foreign governments. 167 Amerada involved a suit under the
159. Id.at 881.
160. Id. at 882 (citing G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc.
A/1034 (1975)).
161. Id.at884.
162. See id.at 878.
163. 630 F.2d at 885. To prove the long-standing acceptance of transitory nature of tort, the Second
Circuit relied on McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. 241, 11 L. Ed. 117 (1843). Id.
164. 630 F.2d at 887.

165. Id. at890.
166. 488 U.S. 428, 109 S. Ct. 683, 102 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1989) [hereinafterAmerada].
167. Amerada, 488 U.S. at 438-39.
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ATCA against Argentina for that country's damaging of a neutral ship
during the Falklands War against the United Kingdom. 168 In a sense, while
the Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision to attach liability to Argentina, under the ATCA, it never repudiated the jurisdictional and interpretive principles set in Filartiga. To date, Filartigaremains compelling
law, and in all but one case, has its holding been rejected or modified into a
narrower jurisdictional interpretation.169 Additionally, in 1992 Congress
appeared to accept the Filartigaholding by passing the TVPA.
B. Marcos I and Kadic v. Karadzic: The Movement toward Corporate
Liability under the A TCA.
Filartiga,as noted above, involved a lawsuit by an individual against a
former government actor for human rights abuses violating the law of na168. Amerada, 488 U.S. at 432. As a result of the damage, the owners scuttled the ship. Amerada,
488 U.S. at 432. In April of 1982, Argentine Forces invaded the Falkland Islands Group then belonging to Great Britain. See generally Thomas M. Frank, Dulce es Decorum est: The Strategic Role of
Legal Principles during the Falklands War, 77 Am. J. Intl. L. 109 (1983). In response, British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher obtained the support of the United Nations Security Council, the United
States Government, and the European Community to launch a military reconquest of the island group.
Id. This war involved fighting between the maritime, land, and air forces of Great Britain and Argentina. Id.
169. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, dismissed a plaintiffs suit against the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Libya for a
terrorist act in Israel. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Judge Bork, in his concurrence, held the ATCA
only extends to torts that would have violated the law of nations in 1789 such as piracy. id. at 814, cert
denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S. Ct. 1354, 84 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1985). Interestingly, Judge Bork's concurrence appears to run afoul of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations. This reads, in pertinent
part:
Universal Jurisdiction to Define and Punish Certain Offenses. A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations
as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism ....
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 (1987).
In the Restatement's comment section, there is discussion on permitting a state to expand the class of
offenses. This section reads:
[I]nternational law permits any state to apply its laws to punish certain offenses although the
state has no links of territory with the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or even
the victim). Universal jurisdiction over the specified offenses is a result of universal condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them, as reflected in widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of international organizations. These offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law.
Universal jurisdiction for additional offenses is provided by international agreements, but it
remains to be determined whether universal jurisdiction over a particular offense has become customary law for states not party to such an agreement.
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 cmt. a (1987).
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tions. After Filartiga,jurisdiction over public individuals and foreign governments continued to be a focus of concern. However, later decisions
eventually provided parameters that could be used in suits against private
corporations.
The first important post-Filartigacase establishing eventual parameters for corporate liability was In re: Estate of FerdinandE. Marcos Human Rights Litigation170 (Marcos 1). This case involved a plaintiffs suit
171
against the estate of former Philippine dictator, Ferdinand Marcos.
While much of the Ninth Circuit's decision dealt with suits barred under
the FSIA, the court provided expansive jurisdictional parameters for cases
under the ATCA. In Marcos I, the Ninth Circuit held that the ATCA
places no limitations as to the citizenship of the defendant as well as the
locus of the injury. 72 Two years after Marcos I, the Ninth Circuit in MarCOS 11173 revisited jurisdictional principles set in the initial case to address
ongoing litigation concerning the Marcos estate. In Marcos II, the Ninth
Circuit further held
extraterritorial application of the ATCA did not violate
174
international law.

In the 1995 case, Kadic v. Karadzic,175 the Second Circuit found that
international law norms apply to private actors who "act in concert with a
state."'176 The court reasoned that certain forms of conduct violate the law
of nations whether undertaken by a state or by a private actor.' 77 The court
further held the example of the prohibition against piracy applies both to
states and to private actors. 178 Kadic involved a lawsuit under the ATCA
against Radovan Karadzic, the head of an unrecognized Bosnian-Serb regime who committed human rights violations against several private vic170. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Marcos I].
171. See 978 F.2d at 495-496. In Marcos I, the plaintiff, Agapita Trajano, filed suit against the estate
of Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoc. Id. at 496. In 1977, Agapita Trajano's
son, Archimedes, during an open university forum, asked Imee Marcos-Manotoc questions regarding
her appointment as a director of an organization. Id. at 495. Shortly after this forum, Archimedes
Trajano was abducted, interrogated, and tortured to death by military intelligence personnel. Id.at 496.
These personnel were under the control of Imee Marcos-Manotoc. Id.
In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc, and other political officials left the Philippines and
resided in Hawaii. In March of that year, Agapita Trajano filed suit under the ATCA against Imee
Marcos Manotoc for false imprisonment, kidnapping, wrongful death, and deprivation of rights. Despite appropriate service and knowledge of the proceedings, Imee Marcos-Manotoc failed to appear at
court and default judgment was entered against her. The court then awarded Agapita Trajano $4.16
million in damages and attorneys fees. Imee Marcos-Manotoc then appealed this verdict. Id.
172. Id.at 500.
173. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994). Marcos H involved challenging a court injunction against the
Marcos Estate from moving its assets outside of the United States. Id. at 1468.
174. Id. at 1475.
175. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
176. Id. at 245.
177. Id. at 239.
178. Id.
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tims. 179 Yet, Karadzic was a direct-albeit private-actor in human rights

abuses.I" 0 Corporations
seldom are direct actors in human rights abuses in
181
ATCA claims.

C. Concurrent CorporateLiability Cases
As a result of Kadic, Doe II involved no radical expansion of the principle under which private, non-state entities, including corporations, can be
liable under the ATCA. Indeed, Doe was not the first case involving a
corporation to go before either a district court or a circuit court. 18 2 How-

ever, for reasons discussed below, the Ninth Circuit was confronted by first
impression issues of law and gave greater recognition to the use of international law not reached by other courts addressing the ATCA.
As Doe worked its way through the district and the appellate courts,
several other ATCA cases involving corporations, mainly engaged in
extraction enterprises, were also brought before the district and the circuit
courts. However, most of these cases were disposed of without any analysis of issues central to adjudicating claims under the ATCA such as defining accomplice liability, establishing what torts could be construed as violating the law of nations, and establishing what, if any, defenses were
available to corporations. For instance, in one of the cases predating Doe
II, Aguinda v. Texaco 183, allegations of widespread environmental destruction and of health problems stemming from Texaco's activities were dismissed by the District Court for the Southern District of New York under
the doctrine offorum non conveniens.184 The Second Circuit upheld this
decision. 185 Likewise, in Jota v. Texaco,186 an
companion case to
Aguinda, the Second Circuit decided not to fullyearlier
determine whether wide179. Id. at 237. The victims in Kadic were Croat Muslims who were, along with family members,
subjected to rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution. These
degradations were carried out by Bosnian Serb forces, "as part of a genocidal campaign conducted
during the course of the Bosnian civil war." Id.
180. See id. at 239 (Karadzic asserted contradictory positions that he was a private individual and a
head of state.).
181. See e.g. Anita Ramasastry, CorporateComplicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon - An Examination ofForcedLabor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of MultinationalCorporations,20 Berkeley J. Intl. L. 91, 101 (2002). In this article, Ramasastry provides three well-defined typologies of
corporate complicity. These are "(1) direct complicity, (2) indirect complicity, and, (3) mere presence
in a country, coupled with silence or inaction." Id. at 100. Ramasastry argues convincingly that Unocal's activities in Myanmar fit into the second category of indirect complicity. Id. at 102-03.
182. See e.g. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalizationof Domestic Law, in The Alien Tort
Claims Act. An Analytical Anthology 9 (Ralph Steinhardt and Anthony D'Amato, eds., Transnatl.
Publishers, 1999).
183. 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
184. 303 F.3d 470,476(2002).
185. Id. at480.
186. 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
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spread environmental degradations violated the law 88of nations18 7 and
remanded the case under the indispensable parties rule. 1
In the Second Circuit case, Bano v. Union Carbide Corp.,189 plaintiffs
sued Union Carbide for violations under the ATCA for claims stemming
from the Bhopal, India disaster. 90 However, because the Indian Government previously settled all claims on behalf of the victims, the plaintiffs
were precluded from bringing suit in the United States. 191 Prior to Bano,
the Second Circuit addressed corporate liability in Bigio v. Coca-Cola
192
In that case, the court determined that a current lease of property
Co.
from Egypt, which had been previously confiscated by the Egyptian government, based on the original owner's religion, did not violate a universal
norm of international law.'93 In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,Inc., 94 the
Fifth Circuit held that a private corporation could be held liable for genoto allege facts that concide.' 95 However, the plaintiffs in that case failed
196
dismissed.
was
case
the
and
stituted genocide
At the district courts, several ATCA cases involving corporate defendants were occurring as well. For example, on September 16, 2002, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 197 dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, finding Nigeria the appropriate jurisdiction.' 98 However,
187. Id. at 159.
188. Id. at 163.
189. 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001).
190. Id at 124. On December 2-3, 1984, a Union carbide chemical plant in the city of Bhopal, India
leaked poisonous gas into "densely populated neighborhoods." Id. at 122. Thousands of people were
killed and hundreds of thousands were injured. Id.
191. Id. at 128-130.
192. 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000).
193. Id. at 449.
194. 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
195. See id. at 167-68 (observing that plaintiff's complaint could have be amended to allege genocide).
196. Id. at 167-68. Beanal's argument was premised on a claim of cultural genocide. Id at 167.
Beanal also argued Freeport engaged in widespread environmental degradations. Id. at 166. However,
the court dismissed this complaint for failing to state a claim under the ATCA. Id. at 166-67.
197. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436 ( S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2002).
198. Id. at *38. In Abdullahi, a class of plaintiffs alleged Pfizer, a United States-based pharmaceutical company, administered an experimental antibiotic, Trovan, in Nigeria without their consent. Id. at
*8. As a result of Pfizer's actions, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered "grave injuries," including child
paralysis, blindness, and death. Id. at *6 The drug used had not yet gained FDA approval during the
period it was administered in Nigeria. Id.
According to the district court,
[I]n January 1999, the FDA recommended that Trovan be prescribed only for patients in
nursing homes or hospitals suffering from life threatening conditions. That following June,
the FDA issued a public health advisory on liver toxicity associated with oral and intravenous Trovan following post-marketing reports of acute liver failure strongly associated with
the drug. The FDA announced that it received reports of more than one-hundred cases
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the court did find that Pfizer's distribution of experimental drugs that resulted in injury and death could be actionable under the ATCA. 99 Likewise, the same district court on July 16, 2002, in Flores v. S. Peru Copper
Corp.,200 held that environmental degradations do not constitute violations
of universally recognized norms and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. 20 ' Finally, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC,20 2 plaintiffs alleged they were victims of
human rights abuses from a British and an Australian mining corporation.2003 The United States District Court for the Central District of California held that while plaintiffs' allegations of torture constituted actionable
claims, the case was dismissed on the political question doctrine.20 4 In
Eastman Kodak v. Kavlin,20 5 the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held where a corporation conspires with a government to deprive a plaintiff of basic civil rights, such as by false imprisonment, the ATCA confers jurisdiction. 0 6 Although, Kavlin did not address
choice of law issues, it provided further analysis as to the expanse of the

where Trovan patients exhibited clinically symptomatic liver toxicity and advised physicians to use Trovan only for patients who met certain criteria. In addition, Pfizer agreed to
limit distribution of Trovan to hospitals and long-term nursing facilities. Further, the European Union's Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products suspended all sales of Trovan
in part due to results from the [Nigeria] tests.
Id. at *7-8 (citations omitted).
199. See id. at *10-*18.
200. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13013 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002) (This case was decided on July 16,
2002, and was unlikely to have any impact on Doe 11.).
201. Id. at *31. In Flores, the court relied, in part, on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law. Id. The court's specific language bears important note to future ATCA cases alleging environmental degradations.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987) supports the position that environmental
pollution, within a nation's borders, that adversely affects human life or health does not violate any
binding rules of international law. Section 601 describes a state's responsibilities with respect to the
environment as follows:
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable
under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and (b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the
environment of another state or of areas beyond the limits ofnational jurisdiction ....
Id. at *31-32.
202. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
203. Id. at 1120-21.
204. Id. at 1208-09.
205. 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
206. Id. at 1094. The district court in this case created language that applies to corporate liability,
holding: "it would be a strange tort system that imposed liability on state actors but not on those who
conspired with them to perpetrate illegal acts through the coercive use of state power." Id. at 1091.

2003

ANALYSIS OF DOE v. UNOCAL CORP.

ATCA's jurisdiction.2 °7 The court, while noting the Supreme Court has yet
to provide an interpretation as to the ATCA's use, also provided guidance
in recognizing a conspiracy liability of corporations for human rights
abuses.2 °8
None of these cases addressed the choice of law to be employed by the
court. Thus, in deciding Doe II, the Ninth Circuit was forced to review the
case, in part, as one of first impression.20 9
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD OF MYANMAR PRIOR TO AND DURING
UNOCAL'S COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

Although Unocal first began negotiating with Myanmar around
1991,210 it wasn't until 1993 that Unocal formally entered into the joint

venture with Total and MOGE. 21' Even prior to 1993, Myanmar possessed
212
From 1990 on, govone of the worst human rights records in the world.
ernment rule was characterized by summary execution; torture; arbitrary
arrest; suppression of freedom of opinion, assembly, and association; and
forced labor.21 3 Myanmar repeatedly denied allegations of human rights
abuses to United Nations officials.21 4

However, the wealth of evidence

provided by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations
(NGO) mutes the government's denials. "In 1989, [both] the [United
States] Senate and House [of Representatives] passed concurrent resolutions condemning human rights violations in [Myanmar]. 215 On July 22,
1991, President George H.W. Bush implemented economic sanctions
against SLORC in response to continued human rights abuses. 1 6
According to the district court in Doe I(b), Unocal executives were
provided with information detailing human rights abuses specific to the
207. Id.at 1090-94.
208. Id. at 1090.
209. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *90 (Doe 11).
210. See, 963 F. Supp. at 884 (Doe 1(a)) (plaintiffs allege Unocal initiated negotiations during or
before 1991.).
211. Id.at 885.
212. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs for the House Committee on
International Relations, 102nd Cong. (1995) (prepared testimony of Holly Burkhalter, Washington
Director of the Human Rights Watch on Human Rights in Burma) (reprinted in Fed. News Serv., Sept.
7, 1995).
213. E.g. United Nations Interim Report, Situation of Human Right in Myanmar, U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, Agenda Item 110(c), at 4(c), U.N. Doc. A/51/466 (1996) [hereinafter U.N. Interim
Report]; Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights, Burma (Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights Feb. 1992)
[hereinafter LCHR].
130-3 1.
214. U.N. Interim Report, supra n. 213, at
215. S. Con. Res. 61, 101' Cong., I" Sess. (1989); H. Con. Res. 185, 101' Cong., 1' Sess. (1989);
135 Cong. Rec. SI0, 165 (daily ed. Aug 4, 1989); LCHR, supra n. 213, at 37.
216. LCHR, supran.213 at43.
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Yadana project.2 17 For example, Human Rights Watch representatives met
with Unocal officials in 1995 and detailed several human rights problem
areas relating to the pipeline. 218 Equally telling, Unocal employees and
consultants expressed concern with human rights abuses occurring in conjunction with the Yadana project. 21 9 And on January 4, 1995 during a
meeting between concerned NGO groups and Imle, the latter apparently
acquiesced his knowledge of forced labor.220 Finally, Total officials shared
information on forced labor with Unocal.22' Clearly, both SLORC's reputation and flow of reports to Unocal provided notice of probable human
rights abuses in connection with the Yadana project.
V. ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT's APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Having established that Doe II represents a case of first impression, it
must first be determined whether the Ninth Circuit correctly applied international law in addressing whether the plaintiffs' allegations stated a claim.
If the plaintiffs' properly stated a claim, then, was the Ninth Circuit correct
in expanding a concept of universal jurisdiction for torts into federal common law when it chose to apply international law over existing federal
common law? If the court was correct and fair in its determination, the
final task is to consider what the foreseeable effects are on legal defenses
for corporate defendants.
A. Matching the Alleged Torts to InternationalLaw: Universal Prohibitions
One means for determining whether an act or crime violates international law is to view the act throughjus cogens. "[A]jus cogens norm is a
principle of international law that is 'accepted by the international community of States as a whole.... ,,,222 Moreover, it represents "'a norm from
which no derogation is permitted ...
,,,223
The D.C. Circuit Court in
Princz v. FederalRepublic of Germany2 24 held:
217. Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1299-1300 (Doel(b)).
218. Id. at 1299.
219. Id.at1299, 1310.
220. Id. at 1300. In response to questioning, Imle replied: "Let's be reasonable about this. What I'm
saying is that if you threaten the pipeline there's gonna be more military. If forced labor goes hand and
glove with the military yes there will be forced labor." Id.
221. Id. at 1302.
222. E.g. Princz v. FederalRepublic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (1994) (citations omitted).
223. Id. (citations omitted).
224. 26F.3d 1166.
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a state violates jus cogens, as currently defined, if it[ ] "practices,
encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. ' 25
In simpler language, the
court to determine whether a
violation of international law,
norm of7 international law ...
case."

22

Ninth Circuit, in Marcos 1226 noted, "for a
plaintiff has a claim for a tort committed in
it must decide whether there is an applicable
and whether it was violated in the particular

Several treaties and conventions detail and define human rights violations.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) 228 is perhaps the best starting point for this determination. This
convention guarantees individuals, among other rights, the right to freedom
of thought, conscience, 229 and movement. 230 The International Covenant
on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR) 231' also provides guidance because
it suggests slave labor is a human rights violation.232 Although the Universal Declarationof Human Rights (UDHR) is not binding law, it too embodies aspirational principles of human rights.233 For instance, it proclaims
a right for fair wages and reasonable periods of rest. 234 Likewise, the later
236
235
conventions such as the Torture Convention and Genocide Convention
225. Id. (quoting the Restatemnent (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §702, cmt. n (1987)).
226. 978 F.2d 493 (1992).
227. 978 F.2d at 502.
228. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
229. Id. at art. 18.
230. Id. at art. 12.
231. InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights (Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S.
3.
232. Id. at art. 7. Article 7 reads, in pertinent part:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favorable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value...
(b) safe and healthy working conditions[.]
Id.
233. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71,U.N.
Doc A/810, (1948).
234. Id.
235. The Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Annex, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51.
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assist any determination of what constitutes a recognized violation. Additionally, there are three regional agreements capable of providing guidance: The Inter-American Treaty on Human Rights, 237 The European
Charter9on Human Rights, 238 and The African Convention on Human
23
Rights.

Prior ATCA case law also provides some guidance as to what otherwise tortious action does or does not violate recognized international human rights law for civil action purposes. For example, certain tortious
interference with commercial activity, such as unregulated or unlawful
picketing, does not provide a basis for suit. 240 Additionally, tortious conversion of personal property does not provide a basis for suit. 24' Nor can
libel provide a basis for suit.2 42 Thus the basis for any civil action filed
under the ATCA is that the alleged tort must constitute a violation of the
law of nations.
The Ninth Circuit, in Doe II, reiterated that one threshold question in
any ATCA case is whether the alleged tort is a violation of the law of nations.243 The court further recognized that torture, murder, and slavery are
jus cogens violations, and thus violations of the law of nations. 24 Additionally, the court accepted that rape can be a form of torture.245 This section analyzes whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in its determination as

236. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948), 78
U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
237. (Nov 22, 1967), 9 I.L.M. 673. Article 6 reads, in pertinent part: "1. No one shall be subject to
slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms, as are the slave trade and
traffic in women... Id.
238. See Charter of FundamentalRights of the European Union, (Nov 4, 1950), 312 U.N.T.S 221
(codified at 2000/C 364/01 <http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf> (accessed June 27,
2003)). Article 5 specifically prohibits slavery, forced or compulsory labor, and human trafficking.
Article 31 is also helpful in providing a recognized norm. It reads: "1. Every worker has the right to
working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity. 2. Every worker has the right
to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of
paid leave." Id.
239. Banjul Charter of June 27, 1981, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), 21 I.L.M. 58. Article 5
reads:
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of dignity inherent in a human being and
to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment
shall be prohibited.
Id.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

E.g. Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers'Intl.Union, 278 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1960).
E.g. Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1981).
E.g. Akbar v. N. Y. Mag. Co., 490 F. Supp. 60,63 (D.D.C. 1980).
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *28.
Id.
Id. (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing rape as torture)).
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to whether the plaintiffs allegations, if true, established offenses of a jus
cogens nature.
1. ForcedLabor
Freedom from slavery is universally recognized as a basic human
right.246 The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly prohibits slavery in all forms but penal.247 Moreover, as noted
above, slavery is outlawed in a number of international agreements and
conventions. Additionally, several post-World War II tribunals recognized
forced labor as a war crime.248 Domestic courts have held forced labor is
the modem variant of slavery. 249 There are several domestic and international precedents defining the prohibition against slavery, or its modem
variant, forced labor. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 250 held that
slave trading constituted a crime in violation of the law of nations. 251 In-

deed, Judge Edwards in a concurring opinion posited that "while most
crimes require state action for ATCA liability to attach, there are 'a handful of crimes', including slave trading, 'to which the law of nations attributes individual liability,' such that state action is not required., 252 Thus,
the issue of forced labor is so serious as to warrant private liability. For
these reasons, the Ninth Circuit in Doe H held forced labor rose to a jus
cogens violation. 3
Forced labor rarely occurs in a vacuum. That is, forced labor is generally part of a larger program of subjugation. In Doe II, forced labor allegedly occurred as a result of the Myanmar Military using a campaign of
violence to create a labor pool.254 This allegation is similar to the use of
246. See ICCPR, Supra n. 228, at art. 8. This article reads in pertinent part: "1.No one shall be held
in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited. 2. No one shall be held in
servitude .... Id.
247. The Thirteenth Amendment reads: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII. The Court, in Pollock v.
Williams, held, "the undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment... was not merely to end slavery but
to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States." 322 U.S.
4, 17, 64 S. Ct. 792, 799, 88 L. Ed. 1095, 1103 (1944).
248. See e.g. Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The "Other
Schindlers," 9 Temp. Intl. & Comp. L.J. 173, 184,244 (1995) (Nuremberg Tribunals).
249. See e.g. In re World War II Era Japanese ForcedLab. Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (N.D.
Cal. 2001); Iwanowa v. FordMotor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,440 (D.N.J. 1999).

250. 726 F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
251.

Id.

252. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *30. (citing Oren, 726 F.2d at794-95 (Edwards, J. concurring)
(emphasis added)).
253. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *29.
254. Id. at *11.
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forced labor in World War II by both Germany and Japan. Indeed, the post
World War II tribunals against industrialists specifically addressing forced
labor provided the Ninth Circuit with some guidance.255 After World War
II, a group of German industrialists was prosecuted by the United States
and its allies Britain and France.256 For example, in 1948, a tribunal for the
French military occupation government indicted directors of the Roechling
Company for crimes against the peace and war crimes.257 Although acquitted of several charges, the chairman of the company, Herman Roechling
was convicted of participating in the deportation of over 200,000 persons
While
from occupied territories into iron and munitions factories.
Roechling did not personally order the deportation to his plants, the deported individuals worked in his plants with both his knowledge and encouragement. 259 Additionally, Roechling executives tolerated the use of a
Gestapo disciplinary court and punishment camp. 260 That Roechling managers did not conduct any punishment of workers themselves did not negate their responsibility. 26' Likewise in I. G. Farben, Chairman Carl
Krauch and four other defendant's were indicted, in part, for slave labor.262
263
At trial, Krauch and the others attempted to use a defense of ignorance.
However, the prosecution successfully argued the I.G. Farben executives
had a fiduciary duty to know the working conditions of their plants.26
Generally, the tribunals permitted a defense of necessity in cases where
refusal to comply with Nazi slave order directives would result in drastic
retaliation. 265 However, this defense was not available to defendants who
voluntarily sought slave labor.26 6 Such was the case at I.G. Farben where
managers actively sought slave labor. 267 Likewise, in the case of U.S. v.

255. See e.g id. at *38 n. 22, *42.
256. See e.g. Lippman, supra n. 248, at 181-86.
257. See The Roechling Case, in 14 Tr. of War Crim. before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control
Council Law No. 10 1097 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1950). Five of the Judges on the tribunal were
French, one was Dutch, and one Belgian. Lippman, supra n. 248, at 182 n. 87.
258. Lippman, supra n. 248, at 182-83 (citing The Roechling Case, in 14 Tr. of War Crim. before the
Nuremburg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1061 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1950)).
259. Lippman supra n. 248, at 182-83.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 184-85.
262. Id. at 206.
263. Id. at 220.
264. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at.*37 (Doe I).
265. Id.
266. 9 Tr. of War Crim. before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1436
(U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1950).
267. Lippman, supra n. 248, at 216-19 (citing Letter from Def. Krauch to Kehrl, Jan. 13, 1944, in 7
Tr. of War Crim. before the Nuremberg Mil. Trib. under Control Council Law No. 10 1081 (U.S. Govt.
Printing Off. 1950)).
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Krupp, the Tribunal denied the defendants a necessity defense, 268
because the
defendants had "taken the initiative in [procuring slave] labor.
Of course, the IMT cases dealt with criminal law jurisdiction where the
defendants faced death or lengthy imprisonment. As noted below, suits
arising under the ATCA are civil and the damages are pecuniary. Assuming that criminal law defenses, such as necessity, are applicable in ATCA
cases, the standard for determining the admissibility of that defense would
be exceedingly high from an evidentiary point. Even the potential loss of
assets and investments would not provide the basis for a defense of necessity. Certainly, a grant of summary judgment could not be based on corporate necessity.
In Doe II, there is no evidence, or even argument, that Unocal was
forced into the Yadana Pipeline Project. Likewise, there is ample evidence
the Myanmar Military used forced labor to aid in the construction of the
pipeline. 269 As noted earlier, Unocal owned a 28.26% share270 in the project and sought to financially benefit from its use. These three facts are
explain why the Ninth Circuit was correct in its denial to Unocal of the
necessity defense. In Section II, this article noted both the district court
and the appellate court found some evidence of Unocal's knowledge of
conditions on the project. Under the Roechling, I.G. Farben, and Krupp
standards, there is a prima facie case of Unocal's liability in "aiding and
abetting" forced labor under the Ninth Circuit's definition of the accomplice liability elements. Whether or not the "aiding and abetting" standard
is correct is addressed below in parts (b) and (c) of Section V. However,
because of the universal consensus against forced labor, and the standards
set under domestic and international law, there is nothing inherently
wrong, or even slightly flawed, in the Ninth Circuit's forced labor analysis.
2. Rape as a Component of Torture
The argument that torture constitutes ajus cogens offense has been accepted by several courts. 271 But is rape a form of torture? The Supreme
Court, in Farmerv. Brennan, 272 settled the issue of including rape within
the ambit of torture in an Eighth Amendment context. 273 In Farmer, a
268.
269.
270.
271.
887.
272.
273.

Lippman, supra n. 248, at 248.
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at.*51 (Doe11).
ThailandFact Sheet, supra n. 25.
See e.g. Cornejo-Barretov. Siefert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000); Filartiga,630 F.2d at
511 U.S.825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994).
511 U.S. at 854 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
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transsexual federal inmate was raped by fellow inmates despite prison officials' alleged knowledge of the danger that the prison's general population
posed to the victim.

274

The court held that deliberate indifference by prison

officials could constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. 275 This is the
clearest domestic example of including rape within torture.
Rape, in the international community has been considered a component of other crimes such as genocide and torture. For example, the ICTY
case, Prosecutorv. Akayesu 276 addressed the crime of rape in the context of
it falling under the aegis of another crime such as genocide. Akayesu was
the first international tribunal to convict an accused for rape. Some legal
scholars note the Akayesu decision is historic because it is the first case to
link sexual violence to genocide and crimes against humanity. 277 This argument may be overblown as Akayesu did not object to the inclusion of
rape under the charged offenses as a legal matter. Yet, there is some significance in the tribunal's inclusion of rape as part of the genocide and
crimes against humanity charges. Specifically, Akayesu was accused of
knowing that the acts of sexual violence and other crimes were being
committed and of being present at times during their commission. He was
further accused of having "facilitated the commission of sexual violence,
beatings and murders by allowing the sexual violence ...

to occur on or

near the Taba bureau communal premises., 278 The tribunal held, sexual
violence crimes, i.e., rape:
constitute genocide in the same way as any other act, as long as
they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and
sexual violence certainly constitute ...

one of the worst ways of

inflicting [sic] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily
and mental harm ....

Sexual violence was an integral part of the

process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of
the Tutsi group as a whole.279

274. 511 U.S. at 830.
275. Farmer,511 U.S. at 839-40.
276. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHI/

cases/Akayesu/judgement/akayOO .htm> (accessed June 27, 2003).
277. Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome
Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, 327 (2002) (allowed rape to be
prosecuted as genocide); Llezlie L. Green, Gender Hate Propaganda and Sexual Violence in the
Rwandan Genocide: An Argument for Intersectionality in InternationalLaw, 33 Colum. Hum. Rights
L. Rev. 733, 763 (rape "may constitute crime against humanity").
278. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T at 12b.
279. Id.at 731.
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The tribunal also found Akayesu guilty of crimes against humanity for
rape.280 The tribunal defined rape and sexual violence as follows: "a
physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under the circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence, which includes rape, is
considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person
under circumstances which are coercive. 281
3. Murder, in Furtheranceof ForcedLabor
In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that, under certain circumstances,
282
summary execution by a private individual violated international law.
Summary execution is a cognizable offense under the law of nations when
committed under the color of state action.28 3 On the other hand, when a
private individual commits murder, absent state action, it is not in violation
of the law of nations. Rather, such an action constitutes the local domestic
crime of murder and nothing more. In Doe II, the Ninth Circuit viewed
murder as a component of forced labor, and therefore liability attached to
Unocal.284 The correctness of this decision is not a matter of simple semantics. Unocal was alleged to have aided and abetted Myanmar.285 The
murder of pipeline workers can be viewed as part and parcel of the forced
labor program. As such, the state action doctrine does not serve to prevent
Unocal's liability.28 6 Yet, even if it did, the court could still apply a Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(b) analysis.287 This rule permits the admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts into evidence to prove motive and
288
intent. 2 8 Myanmar apparently utilized summary execution to promote its
forced labor program and Unocal benefited from the program.

280. Id. at 696.
281. Id.at 598.
282. 70 F.3d. at 243.
283. Id.
284. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *57.
285. Id. at *35.
286. Id. at *56.
287. FRE 404(b) precludes the admission of evidence of "other crimes, wrong doings or acts," unless
such evidence is admitted for other purposes "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
See e.g. U.S. v. Duffaut, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
24461 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2002).
288. Duffaut, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24461 at *209.
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B. Concepts of UniversalJurisdictionunder 28 U S.C. § 1350 and the
Developing Nature of InternationalLaw: The Ninth Circuit'sExpansion in Choice of Law Application.
The ATCA is silent as to what choice of law, international or domestic,
to apply to ancillary issues. The Ninth Circuit, as this paper argues, expanded a concept of universal jurisdiction for torts when it applied nondomestic standards to ancillary issues within the case. The most important
of these ancillary issues is accomplice liability. This full incorporation of
international legal principles was the basis of Judge Reinhardt's disagreement with the majority opinion.289 Was the majority wrong?
One of the perceived difficulties in reconciling the criminal law basis
of universal jurisdiction to tort deals with the choice of law to be employed
by the adjudicating body. Arguably, the inclusion of international over
federal law was a step toward a universal jurisdiction for tort. However,
before analyzing the degree, if any, to which Doe II expanded universal
jurisdiction to tort law, a brief overview may be helpful in delineating the
criminal law basis of universal jurisdiction versus common understanding
of tort law.
Universal jurisdiction has been thought of internationally as a matter
for criminal law. 290 However, torts are thought of as having a transitory
nature. 29 1 That is, "a tort action which follows a tortfeasor wherever he
goes. 292 Under domestic law, a person may sue in one state for a tort
committed in another state, provided both in personam and subject matter
jurisdiction exists. 293 In order to obtain jurisdiction, there must be some
contact with the trial forum. Thus, even with its transitory nature, tort law
has limitations. Additionally, to date, international law places no obligation on a state to provide a tort remedy for violations of human rights. 94
289. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *84-85 (Doe II).
290. See e.g. Beth Stephens, TranslatingFilartiga: A Comparative and InternationalLaw Analysis
of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Intl. L. 1, 41-43 (2002)
[hereinafter TranslatingFilartiga].
291. See e.g. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L. Ed. 1158 (1933) (holding New

Jersey citizen liable for New York auto accident caused by bailee); In re School Asbestos Litigation,
921 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating tort is transitory rather than local).
292. Marcos I, 978 F.2d at 503.
293.

See e.g. Intl. Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945)

("certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional [conceptions] of fair play and substantial justice."' (citations omitted)); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446, 72 S.Ct. 413, 418-19, 96 L. Ed. 485, 493 (1952) (If the defendant's activities in the forum are substantial, continuous, and systematic, general jurisdiction is available. In other words, the foreign defendant is subject to suit even on matters unrelated to his or her
contacts in the forum).
294. See e.g. Beth Stephens, Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime, 60 AIb. L. Rev. 579, 602 (1997) (stating that a "remedy must be adjudicatory").
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As a result, there is no treaty or customary requirement that domestic
courts use international law in place of domestic law for primary and ancillary issues.
Some scholars conclude "[u]niversal jurisdiction fills a gap where
other, more basic doctrines of jurisdiction provide no basis for national
proceedings.,, 295 These scholars argue that tort claims arising under the
ATCA present such a case.296 Under the American system, criminal law
has limitations, in that courts which adjudicate criminal law cases do not
award, except under limited circumstances, financial penalties to victims. 297 However, most crimes, constitute some type of tort. Certainly, the
plaintiffs' allegations in Doe II embody both a crime and a tort.
Both the district court in Doe I and the circuit court in Doe II accepted
that tort, as defined by the ATCA-i.e., law of nations-possessed a type
of universal jurisdiction. This is perhaps because the actual torts alleged
were based on, or at least akin to, "crimes against humanity. 29 8 These
299
offenses possess universality because humanity itself is seen as a victim.
Additionally, this is partly why the Ninth Circuit saw the distinction between tort law and criminal law of minimal relevance. °°
Under international principles, "domestic jurisdiction rests on reconciling a state's interest in a particular offense with other states' interests in the
offense." 3 0 ' That is, there are certain offenses of such gravity that the importance of the geographic location of the offense is minimized. That the
allegations against Unocal fall into this category are best understood in
light of the last sixty years of developing international law. As World War
II ended, allied representatives met in London to finalize a charter detailing
the "constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military
Tribunal" (IMT), which conducted the Nuremberg trials.30 2 The concept of
295. E.g. Bruce Broomhall, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects:
Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdictionfor Crimes under Interna-

tional Law, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 399,400 (2001).
296. See generally Michael Ramsey, 18th Annual Symposium: Multinational Corporate Liability
under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Some Structural Concerns, 24 Hastings Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 361
(2001). (Professor Ramsey does not argue for universal jurisdiction under the ATCA. Rather, his
informative article highlights perceived problem areas for obtaining jurisdiction.)
297. Stephens, TranslatingFilartiga,supra n. 301, at 58.
298. See e.g. Susan Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes
Against Humanity, 10 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 307, 309 (2000).
299. E.g. Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal
Declarationand the Searchfor Accountability,26 Denv. J. Intl. L. & Policy 591, 622 (1998).
300. See Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *44 (Doe 11).
301. Kenneth C. Randall, UniversalJurisdiction under InternationalLaw, 66 Tex L. Rev. 785, 786
(1988).
302. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and the Charterof the InternationalMilitary Tribunal,(Aug 8, 1945) 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement]. Article 2 of the London agreement states that "[tihe
constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal shall be those set in the
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universal jurisdiction for certain offenses gained initial acceptance through
the IMT, and the International Military Tribunals for the Far East, 30 3 as
well as the 1968 Israeli trial of Adolph Eichmann. 3°4 Indeed, other foreign
courts have accepted universal jurisdiction concepts developed in the
Eichmann trial. For example, in the 1989 Ontario High Court of Justice
case, Regina v. Finta,30 5 a Canadian court accepted the principle that state
courts can exercise criminal law jurisdiction "with respect to acts which
occurred outside its territory. '' 30 6 In 1999, a Swiss Military Tribunal indicted and convicted a former Rwandan mayor for war crimes stemming
from the Rwandan genocide.3 °7 These trials added to the growing acceptance that some offenses, such as genocide, constitute crimes against huCharter annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement." Id at
1544-45. In the course of World War II, the Allied Governments issued several declarations concerning the punishment of war criminals. On October 7, 1942, it was announced that a United Nations War
Crimes Commission would be set up for the investigation of war crimes. However, it was not until
October 20, 1943, that the actual establishment of the Commission took place. In the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union issued a joint statement
that the German war criminals should be judged and punished in the countries in which their crimes
were committed, but that, "the major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographic localization," would be punished "by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies." See The Laws of
Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, 881 (Dietrich
Schindler et al. eds., 3d ed., Martinus Nijhoff 1988).
303. Id. at 912-919. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established by a special
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander in the Far East for the Allied
Powers. Id.
304. Israel v. Eichamnn, 36 Intl. L. Rep. 5 (Jerusalem D.C. 1961) (Criminal Case no. 46/61). In
Eichmann, the court recognized universal jurisdiction to prosecute an offense against the Jewish people
that occurred prior to the formation of the State of Israel. The court specifically held:
The State of Israel's 'right to punish', the accused derives, in our view, from two cumulative
sources: a universal source (pertaining to the whole of mankind), which vests the right to
prosecute and punish crimes of this order in every State within the family of nations; and a
specific or national source, which gives the victim nation the right to try any who assault its
existence.
Id. at 30
305. 1989 W.C.B.J. LEXIS8889 (Ontario High Ct. J. June 26, 1989).
306. Id. at (*40).
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken
place abroad, -and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law.
Such a rule would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to
States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory...
Id. at *41 (quoting the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Steamship Lotus, Series A, No.
10 (Permanent Ct. Intl. J. 1927)).
307. See Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor (Trib. Militarie de cassation, Apr. 27, 2001); Amnesty International, 2000, Annual Report on Switzerland <http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar200l.nsf/
webeurcountries/SWITZERLAND?OpenDocument> (accessed June 27, 2003).
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manity that can be prosecuted at any location by any recognized court
complying with basic procedural rights. This acceptance is partly a product of twentieth century history. Following World War II, treaties and
agreements codified crimes against humanity. In the 1990's two ad hoc
tribunals were created by the United Nations Security Council to prosecute
individuals responsible for conducting, in part, crimes against humanity.
These tribunals dealt with crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 30 8 and Rwanda (ICTR). 30 9 The Ninth Circuit expressly referred
to the importance of ICTR and ICTY decisions in furnishing international
law legal definitions.310
As noted in Section III, several district and appellate court cases involving corporate liability under the ATCA existed prior to Doe II. None
of these cases precluded civil action against corporations acting in concert
with foreign governments, or even engaging in independent activities.
That these cases were dismissed on grounds other than jurisdiction, is a
matter of semantics in assessing whether the acceptance of corporate liability under the ATCA expands the statute's universal jurisdiction. On the
other hand, the choice of international law over federal common law for
defining ancillary issues expanded a concept of universal jurisdiction for
tort under the ATCA. The Ninth Circuit had limited guidance in that only
one prior federal court decision addressed the choice of law issue. In Xuncax v. Gramajo,3 11 the United States District Court for Massachusetts con3 12
cluded only international law fulfilled the expectations of the ATCA.
However, Xuncax did not involve a corporate defendant, but rather a former Guatemalan government official.313
Other, non ATCA cases, provide some guidance in assessing whether
Doe H's expansion is justified. As early as 1804, the Supreme Court in
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy established a principle that "an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations. 314 Since that time, several courts have held customary international

308. U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993), reprinted in 32 Intl. Leg. Materials 1192 (1993) (statute of
ICTY).
309. United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, S.C. Res. 955, 49 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the ICTR).
310. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *45 (Doe 11).
311. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); see Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational Corporationsfor Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 Colum. Hum. Rights L. Rev,
359, 403 (1999) (arguing "the language of section 1350 itself suggests that international law is the
substantive law to be applied." However, he does not detail further analysis as to why).
312. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995).
313. Id.at 169.
314. 6 U.S. 64, 118, 2 L. Ed. 208, 226 (1804).
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law was a part of federal common law.3 15 For example, in Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,316 the Second Circuit held that under customary international law, an obligation existed to provide full compensation for an unlawful taking.317 Taking both the Charming Betsey
principle, and the fact that Congress has never delineated definitions of
liability under the ATCA, a valid argument exists for incorporating international law to issues of liability under the ATCA.
Whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in its expansion of universal jurisdiction can be answered by looking to factors generally considered in
choice of law inquiries. Pertinent factors are enumerated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.3 18 Judge Reinhardt viewed chapter 1,
section 6 as helpful, but before reading that section, it is important to understand its context, which is provided in section 1. Section 1 reads:
The world is composed of territorial states having separate and differing systems of law. Events and transactions occur, and issues
arise, that may have a significant relationship to more than one
state, making necessary a special body of rules and methods for
their ordering and resolution.3 19
Section 6 reads as follows:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
315. See e.g. Harold H. Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law, I l1 Harv. L. Rev. 1824, 1837-38
(1998) (Professor Koh cites other cases relating to extradition, official immunity, and prisoner
treatment that incorporate customary international law into federal common law.).
316. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
317. Id. at 892-93.
318. Restatement (Second)of Conflict ofLaws ch. 1 § 1 (1971).
319. Id,
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(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.32 °
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Doe H correctly recognized the ATCA is silent as to a statutory directive on choice of law. The
majority held that "'the needs of the international system' are better served
by applying international law than national law.' 32' In terms of "'the protection of justified expectations"; "the 'certainty, predictability, and uniformity of the result"'; and "the 'ease in the determination and application
of the law to be applied,"' the court noted that their decision embodied
principles dating back to the Nuremburg Tribunals. 2 The majority's logic
is sensible for two reasons. First, based on the widespread knowledge of
human rights conditions in Myanmar, Unocal cannot claim the corporation
was surprised by the nature of the plaintiffs' allegations. Likewise, based
on well-known and long established international law principles, highlighted throughout this article, Unocal could not argue a lack of notice of
these laws. All Unocal could argue was a lack of notice that the court
would apply principles developed in the ICTY and ICTR to ancillary issues in Doe. But, even this argument has a fundamental weakness stemming from the nature of the relationship between tort and criminal law. In
this case, the torts alleged, if true, violated a universal understanding of
international law. In other cases, courts have applied international law to
definitional matters.323
Finally, some scholars and judges have advanced domestic law principles as the proper means to determine liability.324 Some of the principles
advanced are agency law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and reckless disregard. 325
But, these arguments for purely relying on domestic law tend to ignore the
issue that the trier of fact must determine whether a tort committed under
the law of nations occurred. In Doe II, the torts are purely criminal in nature. The allegations are not a matter of simple negligence. As noted
above, almost every crime is a tort. However, the inverse is not necessarily
true. Of course, the plaintiffs could advance alternative domestic theories
of liability as well. But the essential core of this case is a tort determina320. Id.at § 6.
321. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *42 (Doe 11).

322. Id
323. See e.g. Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002);
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2002).

324. See e.g. Courtney Shaw, Student Author, NOTE: UncertainJustice: Liability of Multinationals
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1359, 1374-1379 (2002) (arguing for liability under
42 U.S.C. §1983).
325. See e.g. id.
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tion of internationally recognized criminal activity. In this limited arena,
the Ninth Circuit was correct in applying international definitions to the
ancillary issue of accomplice liability.
Having established that the Ninth Circuit correctly expanded a universal jurisdiction to a tort under the ATCA, the fairness inquiry then becomes
one of determining how different the international law standards are from
the federal common law of accomplice liability. In essence, this is a dual
question of both comparative law and examining Unocal's role in aiding
and abetting forced labor.
C. The Ninth Circuit'sDefinition ofAccomplice Liability: Aiding and
Abetting under the InternationalLaw as opposed to Domestic Law.
In order to analyze the difference between the international and domestic law understanding of accomplice liability, it is first beneficial to define
"aiding and abetting," under federal law. "Aiding and abetting" is essentially a criminal law term. It does not constitute elements of a particular
crime because the concept, and corresponding federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §
2, provides a means for convicting a person for an offense caused by a
principal.3 26 There are usually two components to criminal offenses: actus
reus and mens rea. Actus reus consists of an actual physical act while
mens rea denotes the actor's mental state.327
In criminal law, the elements of "aiding and abetting" are generally as
follows: (1) the principal commits a substantive offense and (2) the defendant charged with the "aiding and abetting" "consciously shared the principal's knowledge of the underlying criminal act, and intended to help the
principal. 328 The actus reus element of "aiding and abetting" is generally
easy to discern because under a theory of accomplice liability, to be guilty,
the defendant must commit an act in furtherance of the principal's offense. 329 For example, where a defendant supplied the principal with a
weapon later used in a bank robbery, the actus reus requirement is satis326. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. The statute does not define a separate crime, but rather provides another
means of convicting someone of assisting another in committing the underlying offense. E.g. U.S. v.
Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1998). In that case, the Fifth Circuit listed three conditions-or
elements--of proof to establish guilt. Id. In a criminal trial, in order to prove a defendant guilty of
aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2, three elements must be met. Id. First, that the defendant
associated with the criminal venture. Second, that the defendant participated in the venture. Id. Third,
that the defendant sought by action to make the venture at succeed. Id.(citation omitted).
327. Black's Law Dictionary defines actus reus as the physical aspect of a crime, whereas mens rea
involves the intent factor. 36 (Henry L. Black et. al eds., 6th ed., West 1990).
328. See e.g 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); Nye & Nissan Corp. v. U.S., 336 U.S. 613,619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93
L. Ed. 919, 925 (1949); U.S. v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S. v. Taylor, 54
F.3d 967, 975 (1- Cir. 1995)).
329. U.S. v. Pipola,83 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1995).
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fied.33 ° On the other hand, the defendant's mental state is important for

assessing whether the mens rea was present to prove guilt. Indeed, the
defendant's beforehand knowledge of the principal's offense is central to
establishing the applicable mens rea for accomplice liability. However, a
"classic formulation of aider and abettor liability . . . does not make the
knowledge requirement" 331 facially clear because some courts have construed this requirement to mean less than full knowledge of an intended
act.332 For example, in U.S. v. Hill, a case involving an illegal gambling
enterprise, the Sixth Circuit defined knowledge as "'the general scope and
333
nature ... and awareness of the general facts concerning the venture.'
Thus, the knowledge requirement is less than a knowing of intricacies, but
rather, knowledge of general purpose. In order to determine Doe II's fairness, the Ninth Circuit's view of "aiding and abetting" must be viewed in
the context that it has been used by the ICTY and ICTR as well as older
international bodies.3 34
As noted in Section II, the Ninth Circuit established the standard for
"aiding and abetting" under the ATCA in Doe II as "knowing practical
assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. 335 In incorporating the ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Furundzija,336 the Ninth Circuit recognized an international law concept establishing the "actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal
law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. ' ' 3 Moreover, the
court accepted that "assistance, 'need not constitute an indispensable element, that is, a conditio sine qua non, for the acts of the principal.' 338 The
Ninth Circuit also reviewed the ICTR's interpretation of "aiding and abetting" in the case Prosecutorv. Musema.339 In that case, the ICTR's definition for the actus reus element consisted of "'all acts of assistance in the
form of either physical or moral support. . . [that] substantially contribute
to the commission of the crime."' 340 In essence, the plaintiffs do not have
330. See id.
331. U.S. v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1995).
332. See e.g. id. (quoting U.S. v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
333. Id.
334. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *36.
335. Id.
336. IT-95-17/1-T ( Dec. 10 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999).
337. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *45.46 (quoting Furundzia,IT-95-17/1-T at 235). Further,
the Ninth Circuit found that the evidence "support[ed] the conclusion that Unocal gave 'encouragement' to the Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor." Id at *53.
338. Id. at *45 (Doe 11) (quoting Furundzija,IT-95-17/1-T at § 3.3(c) T 209).
339. Id. at *47 (Doe II) (quoting Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A (ICTR Jan. 27, 2000)
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/index.htm> (accessed June 27, 2003)).
340. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A at § 3.1.1 126.
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to prove that Unocal's assistance made the forced labor possible. Rather,
the plaintiffs need only prove the Myanmar Military utilized Unocal's assistance. This is a relatively easy burden because of Unocal's investment
in the Yadana Project as well as its technical assistance in the construction.
Additionally, the court further recognized the international law concept
for the mens rea of "aiding and abetting" as "actual or constructive .. .
knowledge [that the accomplice's] actions will assist the perpetrator in the
commission of the crime.",34 1 This reflected the ICTR's view in Musema
that defined the mens rea element as "'[knowledge] of the assistance he
was providing in the commission of the actual offense.' ' 342 Again, this is a
fairly easy burden for the plaintiffs due to the amount of public information
on Myanmar's human rights record available to Unocal.343
Clearly, the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the ICTY and ICTR
definition of "aiding and abetting." How the court's definition disadvantages Unocal is less clear. It is true that actual knowledge is not required
under either domestic or international law, as evidenced in the ICTR and
ICTY cases discussed in this article. It is also true that within the ICTY
and ICTR definition of "aiding and abetting", moral support can establish
the actus reus. None of the ICTR and ICTY cases involve funding. However, an analogy can be drawn to other activities of support. For example,
in the ICTR case, Prosecutor v. George Ruggiu,344 the tribunal found a
journalist guilty as a de facto aider and abettor for making several broadcasts encouraging Hutu to kill Tutsi.34 5 In Doe II, Unocal is not alleged to
have provided moral support in the sense of a radio broadcast. Yet, a compelling analogy can be drawn that Unocal's financial and advisory relationship with the Myanmar Military provided support.
As noted above, the plaintiffs' allegations established a prima facie
case against Unocal under the court's definition of "aiding and abetting."
In viewing the prima facie determination, it is necessary to keep in mind
that, the standard burden of proof in civil suits is by a "preponderance of
the evidence" not beyond a "reasonable doubt., 346 There was evidence
Unocal knew about general allegations of human rights violations such as
forced labor.3 47 Additionally, Unocal knew Total had contracted with
SLORC for the Myanmar Military to provide security for the pipeline con341. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *47 (Doe I) (quoting Musema, ICTR-96-13-A at § 3.11
126) (brackets in original).
342. Id. at *48 (quoting Musema, ICTR-96-13-A at § 3.22 180).
343. Id. at *53 n. 29
344. ICTR-97-32-I ( ICTR June 1, 2000).
345. Id.at 44 (a).
346. For a discussion of standards of proof, see e.g. U.S. v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182 (W.D.N.Y.
2002).
347. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *15 (Doe II).
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struction project.348

Lastly, Unocal's involvement in attending security

meetings and overseeing the joint venture 349 along with Total and MOGE
could be seen as evidence of rendering assistance or encouragement to the
Myanmar Military. 350 Applying the evidence accepted by the court to a
domestic standard of "aiding and abetting," there is a primafacie case established as well. The participation in a joint venture with a known offender is one aspect of establishing a prima facie case. Unocal's various
acts of attending joint venture meetings, 351 and supplying funds and construction oversight crews 35 2 for the Yadana project clearly go to the actus
reus element.353 As for the mens rea requirement, the court record appears
to contain enough evidence showing knowledge. 354 E-mails between company officers,355 advice from consultants,35 6 notice from a Total representative, and repeated contacts from NGO's 357 show a prima facie case of
knowledge.
VI. EXAMINING THE FORESEEN CONSEQUENCES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
DECISION TO OTHERWISE APPLICABLE DEFENSES: ACT OF STATE, RULE
19, AND FORUMNON CONVENIENS

A. Act of State Doctrine

The act of state doctrine has evolved since its conception.35 8 Initially,
the doctrine was seen as a principle of comity between sovereign states. 59
However, it has transformed into a prudential concern regarding the separation of powers. 360 The Court in Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino
recognized the executive's role in foreign policy, including fostering human rights and democracy.36 ' When the executive branch, through the
348. Id. at *7.
349. Id. at *53.
350. Id. at *49.
351. Id.at *117.
352. Id. at *60.
353. Id. at *51.
354. Id. at *54.
355. Id. at *40.
356. Id. at*13.
357. Id. at *14.
358. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envil. Tectonics, 493 U.S. 400, 404, 110 S. Ct. 701, 704, 107 L. Ed.
816, 822, (1990).
359. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Lumber Co., 246 U.S. 297,
303-304, 38 S. Ct. 309, 311, 62 L. Ed. 726, 732 (1918)).
360. W.S. Kirkpatrick& Co., 493 U.S. at 404 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423).
361. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404. The Court fashioned a three-part test to determine
whether the act of state doctrine should apply. This test is as follows:
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State Department, files a brief with the court, the executive branch's arguments are given tremendous deference.362 For example, in a recent ATCA
case against ExxonMobil and Indonesia, in the United States District Court
363
for the District of Columbia, the State Department filed an amicus brief.

This filing was done in response to a specific judicial request. 364 As of this
article's publication date, the court has not decided whether dismissal under this doctrine is appropriate. Thus, a corporation such as Unocal could
have the executive branch as a powerful ally in any ATCA court proceeding. Such a legal defense however, becomes almost untenable without the
assistance of the executive branch.
In Doe II, the Ninth Circuit recognized the Second Circuit's opinion in
Kadic, that "it would be a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit under [the [ATCA]]. 3 65 This is, in part, because, jus cogens
violations tend to diminish the act of state defense's vitality.366 However,
the Ninth Circuit declined to establish a blanket rule barring the act of state
doctrine in ATCA cases.367 In part, this may have been because the execu[I] The greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it..
• . [2] The less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the
weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches. [3] The balance of relevant considerations may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged
act of state is no longer in existence ....
Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at * 72 (Doe 11) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428) (ellipses and
brackets from Doe 11).
The Ninth Circuit added a fourth factor to this test in holding, "we must also consider whether the state
was acting in the public interest. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at * 72 (Doe 11) (quoting Liu v.
Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989)).
362. Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 419.
363. See Amicus Curiae, United States Statement of Interest, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Civ. Action
No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. July 29, 2002). In this brief, the United States avers:
[T]he Department of State believes that adjudication of this lawsuit at this time would in
fact risk a serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States... related directly to the on-going struggle against international terrorism. It may also diminish our ability to work with the Government of Indonesia ("GOI") on a variety of important programs,
including efforts to promote human rights in Indonesia.
Id. at 1.
The brief further details economic interests in writing: "This litigation appears likely to
courage foreign investment, particularly in extractive industries in remote or unstable areas
security protection. This, in turn, could have decidedly negative consequences for the
economy." Id. at 4.
364. Id. at 1.
365. Doe, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at *71 (Doe 11) (quoting Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250.
original).
366. See id. at *73.
367. See id. at ** 71-73.

further disthat require
Indonesian
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tive branch did not file an amicus brief to the court. Lastly, the court's
reasoning in Doe was not inconsistent with prior case decisions from other
circuit courts. For example, in Bigio v. Coca-Cola,the Second Circuit held
368
the act of state doctrine was to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
As such, the common sense of the court may likely compose a significant
factor in determining whether permitting adjudication will "likely impact
foreign relations," or "embarrass or hinder the executive in the realm of
foreign relations. 369 Based on its view of common sense, the court determined the act of state doctrine did not apply.37 °
1. FederalRule of Civil Procedure,Rule 19
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 19 requires that indispensable parties to a lawsuit must be identified. 371 As noted earlier, corporate defendants in prior ATCA cases have benefited from this rule. The
district court, in denying Unocal's FRCP Rule 19 dismissal, set precedent
for cases involving forced labor. So too did the Ninth Circuit in not reviewing this issue. It may be argued that Rule 19 should not apply in any
ATCA case. If an act committed "in violation of the law of nations" is
truly akin to a crime against humanity, then liability should not give way to
dismissal under Rule 19. If future courts accept this logic, then Doe II is
truly a revolutionary case. If, on the other hand, Doe II is merely narrowed
to economic expectations and possible financial damage weighing, then it
joins a group of persuasive cases.
2. Remaining JurisdictionalIssues: Does Forum Non Conveniens
Apply to ATCA claims?
Doe II did not squarely address the issue offorum non conveniens, but
it warrants discussion in this article because all of the litigation elements
regarding this doctrine exist in the history of Doe (I & II). The doctrine of
forum non conveniens involves the dismissal of lawsuits brought by plaintiffs in their favored forum in favor of adjudication in a foreign court.372 It
368. 239 F.3d at 452 (citing Allied Bank Intl. v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,757 F.2d 515,
520 (2d Cir. 1985).
369. Id.
370. Id.at 444. The Court noted that the Bigios' property was confiscated by the administration of
then President Nasser. Id. At the time of the case, Nasser had been dead for thirty years. Id.
371. FRCP 19(a) provides that a person is a necessary party if: "(1) in the person's absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action..."
372. GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504, 67 S. Ct. 839, 841, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 1060 (1947);
Koster v. Am. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. 330 U.S. 518, 531-32, 67 S. Ct. 828, 835, 91 L. Ed. 1067,
1077-78 (1947).
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"is a discretionary device permitting a court in rare instances to 'dismiss a
claim even if the court is a permissible venue with proper jurisdiction over
the claim."'' 373 A two-step process developed to assess whether forum non
conveniens dismissal is appropriate. The first step involves determining
whether an adequate alternative forum exists.374 If the answer is in the
affirmative, the second step requires courts to "balance a series of factors
involving the private interests of the parties in maintaining the litigation in
the competing fora and any public interests at stake." 375 This doctrine's
applicability to claims arising under the ATCA is questionable for a number of reasons. First, human rights abuses violating international rights
rarely occur in a state with a defined and respectable legal system. Second,
because the ATCA requires state action, or as argued in this article commercial activity rising to the level of state action, it is unlikely the host
government will permit a fair hearing.
In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company376 the Second Circuit addressed the doctrine in light of the ATCA. Wiwa involved Nigerian plaintiffs alleging that the Nigerian government tortured and killed family
members and themselves at the behest of Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Oil Nigeria (SON).3 77 The parent company of SON, Royal
Dutch Petroleum, and one of its subsidiaries pertinent to the suit, Shell
Transport and Trading Company (STTC), were listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and maintained an investor relations office in New York
City. 378 However, Royal Dutch Petroleum and STCC were incorporated in

the Netherlands and Great Britain. 379 Additionally, one of Royal Dutch
Petroleum's subsidiaries, Shell Petroleum Inc (SPI), and SPI's subsidiary,
Shell Oil Company performed extensive commerce operations in the
United States. 380 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's suit under the
forum non conveniens doctrine. 381 This occurred, in part, because the defendant corporation argued the case should be tried in Great Britain.382 As
to the second prong, the district court found a balancing of public and pri-

373.

Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d. 88, 100 (quoting PT United Can Co. v. Crown

Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998)).
374. Id. (citing Gilbert,330 U.S. at 506-07).
375. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09).
376. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).

377. Id. at 92.
378. Id. at 93.
379. Id. at 92.
380. Id. at 93.

381. Id. at 108.
382. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100.
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vate factors made the British forum preferable.38 3 However, the Second
Circuit concluded the district court failed to give weight to three significant
considerations that favored retaining jurisdiction.38 4 First, the court held
that since one of the plaintiffs was a United States resident, retaining jurisdiction was proper. 385 Second, the court held United States interests in
furnishing a forum to litigate claims of violations of international standards
of the law of human rights were compelling.386 Finally, although the court
recognized British courts as "exemplary in their fairness and commitment
to the rule of law," this recognition did not outweigh the interests of either
prior reason.38 7
In Wiwa the Second Circuit declined to readdress the original intent
behind the ATCA.3 88 Rather, the court found, that after the TVPA was
incorporated into the ATCA, the ATCA expressed "a policy favoring receptivity by our courts to such suits. ' 389 The court reasoned that permitting
a forum non conveniens dismissal could represent a setback for human
rights litigation. 390 However, the court declined to establish an across the
board rule that denied forum non conveniens to defendants in all ATCA
cases. 391 Instead, the court determined forum non conveniens dismissal
could not be granted, "unless the defendant has fully met the burden of
showing that the Gilbert factors 'tilt[] strongly in favor of trial in the
foreign forum.' ' 3 92 Should Doe 11 not settle and be upheld, it appears
likely from the language of Doe II, relying on the Wiwa precedent, that
forum non conveniens is not an option for Unocal.

383. Id. at 92. The plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the British forum "because three doctrines
of English law-double actionability, transmissibility, and the act of state doctrine-created a likely
bar to a British court" hearing the suit. Id. at 100.
384. Id. at 101.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 105 n. 10. "Whatever the intent of the original legislators (a matter that is forever hidden
from our view by the scarcity of relevant evidence), the text of the Act seems to reach claims for international human rights abuses occurring abroad." Id.
389. Id. at 105. In determining the effect of the TVPA on the ATCA, the court viewed two changes
in the statutory wording. First, there was a shift "from addressing the courts' 'jurisdiction' to addressing substantive rights." Second, "the change from the ATCA's description of the claim as one for 'tort
... committed in violation of the law of nations. .. ' to the new Act's assertion of the substantive right
to damages under U.S. law." Id.
390. Id. at 105.
391. Id. at 106. The court states "This is not to suggest that the TVPA has nullified, or even significantly diminished, the doctrine offorum non conveniens. The statute has, however, communicated a
policy that such suits should not be facilely dismissed on the assumption that the ostensibly foreign
controversy is not our business." Id.
392. Id. (quoting R. Maganlal& Co. v. MG. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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VII. CONCLUSION
When the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court in Doe II, new precedent was set. While there was nothing inherently wrong in the court's legal interpretation, the decision, if upheld, will have dramatic effect on the
law. The ATCA will not only provide plaintiffs with a remedy against
corporations "aiding and abetting" human rights violators, it may also
cause multinational corporations to better monitor their overseas financial
activities. Perhaps this deterrent will better promote human rights and democratic development in troubled areas. The reason for this possibility
rests in the expansion of a universal jurisdiction for tort. The Ninth Circuit's choice of law analysis is broad, but correct for the limited purpose of
adjudicating claims under the statute. The analysis is fair in that the result
differs little from domestic civil theories. It is also fair in that the choice of
law better reflects the nature of offenses committed in violation of the laws
of nations. Finally, the foreseeable circumstances are not so burdensome
as to inhibit overseas commerce. Rather, it will provide victims of human
rights abuses committed in violation of international law with a forum for
redress. Additionally, it may result in forcing multinational corporations
from the role of enabler of violator regime to a true reforming influence.

